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ABSTRACT 
Yuna C. Kim: Harm Reduction and Substance Use: Examining the Politics and Policy Impacts 
(Under the direction of Krista M. Perreira) 
This dissertation evaluates the impacts and political dynamics of harm reduction policies 
concerning substance use in North America. In doing so, this three-essay dissertation focuses on 
two substance use policies: medical marijuana laws (MMLs) and supervised injection services 
(SISs).  
The first two essays evaluate the unintended impacts that result from the implementation 
of MMLs in the U.S. The first essay evaluates the impact of state-level MML implementation 
and specific policy dimensions (i.e., dispensaries, patient registries, and in-home cultivation) in 
the U.S. on non-drug related arrest rates and crime rates for violent and property crimes. The 
second essay analyzes the effect of each MML policy dimension on the probability of cigarette 
smoking among U.S. adults.  Considered together, these two essays highlight various unintended 
downstream impacts that need to be taken into consideration as policymakers adopt and 
implement MMLs.  
The third essay is a political evaluation of the barriers to adopting SISs in North America. 
The dearth of SISs in North America is puzzling considering the wealth of evidence suggesting 
their effectiveness in preventing overdoses and connecting injection drug users with treatment 
resources. Using the Canadian province of Ontario as a case study, this essay identifies the 
political barriers to adopting SISs and considers the limits and possibilities of establishing SISs 
in the North American context. 
 iv 
Taken as a whole, this three-essay dissertation provides valuable information to 
policymakers considering the implementation of MMLs or SISs. Policymakers considering 
marijuana legalization should be cognizant of the impact of particular policy dimensions on 
arrest rates and tobacco use to mitigate additional costs that may outweigh benefits. Moreover, 
this research underscores the importance of understanding the political environment in which 
harm reduction policies are made. 
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CHAPTER 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Harm reduction is an approach that emphasizes minimizing the health and social 
consequences associated with drug use instead of reducing consumption.  Rather than viewing 
drug use as a criminal or immoral act, harm reduction takes a value-neutral public health 
perspective to substance use and focuses on minimizing risks to both the drug user and the 
surrounding community (i.e., reducing negative externalities) (Cheung, 2000; Marlatt, 1996).  
Under this umbrella of harm reduction, this dissertation evaluates two policies that affect 
substance use: medical marijuana laws (MMLs) and supervised injection services (SISs).   
To date, 23 states plus the District of Columbia have passed MMLs, with California 
being the first to implement such a law in 1996.  These laws protect medical marijuana users 
from state-level criminal penalties and allow access to marijuana through cultivation at home or 
dispensaries (Hoffmann & Weber, 2010; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014).  
Patients must obtain approval from a doctor before they are allowed to acquire medical 
marijuana. MMLs also provide protection from prosecution for the doctors who make the 
recommendations (Anderson, Hansen, & Rees, 2013; Hoffmann & Weber, 2010).  
MMLs embody characteristics of harm reduction. MMLs represent a shift from 
criminalizing certain marijuana users to providing a government-sanctioned avenue for patients 
to obtain medical marijuana to alleviate symptoms of a wide range of conditions. Consequently, 
harms associated with incarceration, enforcement costs, and the black market are potentially 
reduced with the legalization of medical marijuana (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001). As with any 
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policy, however, unintended consequences can result. The first two essays of this dissertation 
examine the positive and negative externalities that result from MMLs. The first essay evaluates 
the impact of state-level MML implementation in the U.S. on non-drug related arrest rates and 
crime rates for violent and property crimes. The second essay determines the effect of MMLs on 
the probability of cigarette smoking among U.S. adults.  Considered together, these two essays 
highlight various unintended downstream impacts that should be taken into consideration as 
policymakers adopt and implement MMLs. 
The contentious and often stigmatized nature of harm reduction policies, such as SISs, 
warrants an in-depth understanding of the politics of implementing such measures. SISs are 
medical clinics that provide a safe environment where injection drug users can consume pre-
obtained illicit drugs.  Clean and sterile equipment are provided to patients and medically trained 
staff are available to intervene in the event of an overdose.  SISs epitomize harm reduction as 
they aim to reduce the transmission of infections, such as HIV/AIDS, by providing clean 
equipment and education on safe injection practices rather than enforcing abstinence. Such 
clinics, however, are extremely controversial in North America and are viewed by some as a 
practice that condones illicit drug use.  While nearly 90 supervised injection facilities are in 
operation worldwide, primarily in Europe (Schatz & Nougier, 2012), currently only two 
supervised injection sites are in operation in North America in Vancouver, British Columbia, 
Canada.  The dearth of SISs in North America is puzzling considering the wealth of evidence 
suggesting their effectiveness in preventing overdoses and connecting injection drug users with 
treatment resources (DeBeck et al., 2011; Marshall, Milloy, Wood, Montaner, & Kerr, 2011; 
Wood, Tyndall, Zhang, Montaner, & Kerr, 2007). Using Ontario as a case study, the third essay 
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identifies the political barriers to adopting SISs and considers the limits and possibilities of 
establishing SISs in the North American context. 
Essay One 
Proponents of marijuana legalization often argue that moving away from prohibition 
would reduce the number of marijuana-related arrests, decrease crime in the black market, and 
alleviate public spending on the criminal justice system. However, these arguments often do not 
consider the impact of such policies on non-drug related crimes and arrest rates. To examine the 
potential effect of legalization, this study evaluates the impact of state-level MMLs and specific 
policy dimensions (i.e., dispensaries, patient registries, and in-home cultivation) on the arrest 
rates for a variety of violent and property crimes for all ages, adults, and juveniles. This study is 
also the first to consider the differential impact of state dispensary policies, where some states 
only allow a limited number of dispensaries while others permit a less restricted market.  
Depending on which MML policy dimensions are enacted within a state, MMLs could 
differentially impact arrest rates. Drawing upon arrest data from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Uniform Crime Reports, I employ a fixed effects estimation strategy that uses state-
fixed effects along with state-specific linear time trends.  The findings suggest that states with 
dispensaries experience an increase in robbery and property crime arrest rates.  This is especially 
true for states that operate an unrestricted dispensary market.  Patient registries also increase 
arrest rates for most property crimes, but the effect is primarily driven by the adult population.  
In-home cultivation allowances have protective effects, decreasing the arrest rates for theft and 
auto theft.  Furthermore, the results indicate that changes in arrest rates are largely influenced by 
the effect of MMLs on crime levels rather than their impact on law enforcement allocation.  The 
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paper concludes with a discussion of valuable lessons for policymakers and implications for 
states considering legalization in the future. 
Essay Two 
While the percent of cigarette smokers has leveled off at just under 20 percent in recent 
years, the prevalence of past-year marijuana use among U.S. adults more than doubled between 
2001-2002 and 2012-13. The rise in marijuana use may be attributed to softening attitudes and 
laws towards marijuana use. Cigarette smoking due to increased access to marijuana is of 
particular concern as many recreational marijuana users combine tobacco with marijuana in the 
form of blunts or spliffs. This study evaluates the impact of MMLs on cigarette smoking among 
American adults.  Differences by health status are also considered given that the target 
population for MMLs is those suffering from chronic physical and mental health conditions. 
Moreover, the study also considers differences in smoking probabilities by gender since males 
use cigarettes and marijuana at higher rates than females. Drawing upon data from the 1993-
2010 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System surveys (N=2,722,046), I estimate linear 
probability models using a fixed effects identification strategy to identify the relationship 
between MML policy dimensions (i.e., in-home cultivation, dispensaries, and registries) and the 
probability an individual is a current smoker. The findings indicate that adults in states with 
dispensaries and registries were 1.4 and 2.0 percentage points less likely to be current smokers, 
respectively. In contrast, adults in states with in-home cultivation were 1.1 percentage points 
more likely to report current smoking. The effect of dispensaries, registries, and in-home 
cultivation did not differ between males and females. However, the increase in smoking 
probability due to in-home cultivation was largely driven by the healthy individuals. This 
increase in cigarette smoking among healthy individuals may be indicative of spillovers of 
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homegrown marijuana to recreational users. The experience from legalizing medical marijuana 
can be leveraged to inform other states considering marijuana legalization. In particular, public 
health officials seeking to discourage cigarette use should be weary of in-home cultivation 
allowances without a system in place to monitor and enforce cultivation limits. 
Essay Three 
Despite legal precedence, a demonstrated need, and considerable empirical evidence 
indicating several public health and fiscal benefits, SISs have yet to take root in North America 
beyond Vancouver, British Columbia. To understand the barriers to establishing SISs in North 
America, this study looks at the case of Ontario to identify the factors that have prevented the 
adoption of SISs in this province. Data for this case study were obtained from 11 semi-structured 
key informant interviews and document reviews. Transcripts were analyzed deductively, using 
Kingdon’s three-streams model and the institutions-ideas-interest (“triple-I”) framework of 
agenda setting to identify the factors that contribute to the success or failure of policy adoption. 
The major barriers to establishing a SIS in Ontario were the result of several factors. First, SISs 
cross jurisdictional boundaries and require the alignment of multiple local, provincial, and 
federal stakeholders. Second, proponents were reluctant to submit applications for SISs due to 
strong opposition from the federal government and police. Third, competing political priorities 
put SISs low on the provincial policy agenda. The examination of the political treatment of SISs 
in Ontario illustrates the possibilities and limits in establishing harm reduction services for 
injection drug users in the North American political environment. In particular, timing and a 
strong understanding of concurrent political challenges are important considerations to facilitate 
the successful establishment of SISs in other policy contexts. 
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CHAPTER 2: MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS, ARREST RATES, AND CRIME 
I. Introduction 
 As of 2013, the U.S. had the highest prison population rate in the world at 716 per 
100,000 people (Walmsley, 2013). Combined with an estimated cost per inmate ranging from 
$21,000 to nearly $34,000 per year (La Vigne & Samuels, 2012), incarceration costs place a 
great deal of pressure on the public purse.  In 2013 (the most recent data available), most arrests 
in the U.S. were for drug abuse violations (over 1.5 million), and approximately 40 percent of 
these drug abuse violation arrests were for marijuana possession (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2013).  Thus, policy interventions that remove the penalty or reduce incarceration 
associated with possession of small amounts of marijuana could result in substantial cost savings 
to the criminal justice system. 
The legalization of drugs, particularly marijuana, is one policy option that is often 
considered as a way to reduce the incarceration rate and associated criminal justice costs. 
According to one estimate, lifting the prohibition on marijuana could reduce drug enforcement 
costs by over $3 billion per year (Miron & Waldock, 2010).  To date, Colorado, Washington, 
Alaska, Oregon and the District of Columbia have legalized marijuana for recreational use in 
some form.  However, sufficient data are not yet available to be able to determine the effect of 
legalization on crime and arrest rates as well as other outcomes (i.e., health and health 
behaviours).  Instead, studies can turn to state medical marijuana laws (MMLs) to provide 
insights on the potential impact a legalized market for marijuana may have on crime and arrest 
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rates in the U.S.  Currently, 23 states and the District of Columbia have passed a MML.  
Although MMLs are not a perfect proxy for a fully legalized recreational market, they share 
many of the features of a legal market.  For instance, MMLs protect qualified users from 
penalties for possession of small amounts of marijuana; retail stores are allowed to sell cannabis 
and cannabis products to eligible customers; and in some cases, medical users may be allowed to 
grow their own marijuana plants at home.  The legalization of medical marijuana is essentially a 
limited legal market, which can be examined to approximate the effects of a fully legal marijuana 
market on crime and arrests. 
The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of MMLs on arrest rates and crime 
between 1994-2012, during which time 18 states enacted a MML.  In doing so, this study builds 
on the existing literature that has examined the externalities associated with MMLs (Anderson, 
Hansen, & Rees, 2013; Morris, TenEyck, Barnes, & Kovandzic, 2014; Wen, Hockenberry, & 
Cummings, 2015).  The contributions of the present study are threefold.  First, this study 
examines the differences in arrest rates between adults and juveniles, which has not yet been 
studied in the literature.  Youth are at an earlier stage of cognitive development and the 
motivation to commit crimes may be quite different compared to adults (Center for Child and 
Family Policy, 2007).  Second, this study considers the impact of individual policy dimensions 
as well as the impact of different state policies on dispensaries (i.e., unrestricted vs. restricted 
dispensary markets).  This is the first known study that compares the differential effect of 
unrestricted and restricted dispensary policy frameworks at the state level. Third, this study 
explores the mechanisms through which MMLs may influence arrest rates.  That is, this study 
examines whether changes in arrest rates were due to changes in law enforcement levels or due 
to changes in the level of criminal activity following the implementation of a MML  
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The outline of the paper is as follows: section II discusses the background literature on 
drugs and crime.  This discussion includes an overview of existing studies on MMLs, crime, and 
arrest rates.  The following section describes the data and analytic approach used to determine 
the impact of MMLs on arrest rates and crime.  Section IV and V present the results and 
sensitivity analyses.  The paper closes with a discussion of the policy implications of the study’s 
findings. 
 
II. Background 
Theoretical Linkages between Drug Use, Crime, and Arrests  
The relationship between marijuana and crime is most widely characterized using 
Goldstein’s (1985) tripartite conceptual framework, which offers three explanations for the 
connection between drug use and crime.  First, the psychopharmacological explanation posits 
that the short or long-term use of drugs leads to violent and potentially criminal behaviour.  
However, evidence in support of the psychopharmacological explanation with respect to 
marijuana is weak.  While a few studies find links between prolonged or high-levels of marijuana 
use and violent crime and property damage, especially among youth (Baker, 1998; Fergusson & 
Horwood, 1997; National Research Council, 1993; Norström & Rossow, 2014), many other 
studies find that marijuana use temporarily inhibits aggression and violence (Boles & Miotto, 
2003; Goldstein, 1985; Markowitz, 2005; National Research Council, 1993; Pacula & Kilmer, 
2003).  Moreover, Pacula and Kilmer (2003) and Resignato (2000) find weak or insufficient 
evidence to support a causal link between marijuana use and commission of violent crimes. The 
psychopharmacological explanation therefore may be less applicable in explaining the link 
between marijuana use and criminal activity and subsequent arrests. 
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The second explanation, the economic compulsive model, suggests that violent crime 
occurs when drug users engage in income-generating crimes, such as robbery, to finance their 
drug use (Goldstein, 1985; National Research Council, 1993). Although the primary motivation 
is to acquire money to purchase drugs, additional violence often occurs due to the situation or 
environment in which the crime is committed (e.g., use of weapons by the offender or victim of 
the income-generating crime) (Goldstein, 1985).  The economic compulsive model has also been 
applied to explain non-violent economic crimes, such as shoplifting, theft, burglary, or other 
property crimes that generate income.  Marijuana users, especially younger or financially 
constrained users, may commit such crimes to obtain the resources to purchase marijuana 
(Baker, 1998; Dembo et al., 1992; Goldstein, 1985; Miron & Zwiebel, 1995; Pacula & Kilmer, 
2003; Popovici, French, Pacula, Maclean, & Antonaccio, 2014).  
Third, the systemic model suggests that violence is embedded in the illicit drug 
distribution network. Examples of systemic violence include disputes over territory between rival 
drug dealers (e.g., “turf wars”), assaults or homicides committed to enforce hierarchies within 
drug dealing organizations, robberies of drug dealers, punishments for failing to pay debts, or 
punishments for selling adulterated drugs (Goldstein, 1985; National Research Council, 1993; 
Pacula & Kilmer, 2003). Systemic violence has been attributed to the prohibition of drugs.  
Given the inability to access a formal legal conflict resolution mechanism, such as the judicial 
courts, underground market participants have little choice but to turn towards violence to resolve 
disputes under prohibition (Kleiman, Caulkins, & Hawken, 2011; Miron & Zwiebel, 1995; 
National Research Council, 1993; Pacula & Kilmer, 2003; Werb et al., 2011).  Since the 
government is not available in an illegal market to secure property rights and enforce contracts 
between sellers, black market participants often have to resort to violence to resolve conflicts 
  11 
(Resignato, 2000).   Violence can also arise because drug dealers are attractive targets for 
robbery since they are often carrying large amounts of cash or drugs.  In an attempt to protect 
themselves, sellers arm themselves, which may result in violent confrontations with potential 
robbers (Resignato, 2000). The systemic model thus points to the illegal nature of the drug 
market as a contributing factor to violence and crime.  
 Related to the systemic model is the notion that crime increases due to drug law 
enforcement (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001; Werb et al., 2011). The allocation of scarce law 
enforcement resources towards drug-related offences inevitably leaves fewer resources available 
to prevent property or violent crimes committed elsewhere (Benson, Kim, Rasmussen, & 
Zhehlke, 1992; Benson, Leburn, & Rasmussen, 2001; Resignato, 2000). As found in several 
studies of crime in the U.S., the opportunity cost of increasing police resources to enforce drug 
laws has been a reduction in efforts to reduce non-drug crimes and an increase in violent and 
property crimes (Benson et al., 2001; Resignato, 2000; Shepard & Blackley, 2005). Thus, 
policies that reduce the need to monitor drug law violations may lead to a decline in crime rates 
in other areas. 
 
Overview of Medical Marijuana Laws 
 In 1996, California became the first state to pass a medical marijuana law. Since then, 22 
states plus the District of Columbia have passed their own MML. As marijuana remains a 
Schedule I drug at the federal level, doctors in those states are allowed to recommend the use of 
marijuana but are not allowed to prescribe or directly dispense marijuana (Hoffmann & Weber, 
2010). States with MMLs also outline a number of conditions or symptoms for which medical 
marijuana can be recommended. The list of conditions, which varies by state, encompasses 
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Alzheimer’s disease, arthritis, asthma, cachexia or wasting syndrome, cancer, Crohn’s disease, 
glaucoma, Hepatitis C, HIV/AIDS, migraines, multiple sclerosis, psychological conditions (such 
as post-traumatic stress disorder), seizures (including epilepsy), or severe and chronic pain 
among other conditions (ProCon, 2015b). These state-level laws allow qualifying patients to 
possess limited quantities of marijuana and receive a recommendation from a doctor without the 
risk of criminal penalties for either party (Anderson et al., 2013; Hoffmann & Weber, 2010; 
National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). Although marijuana is still illegal according to 
federal law, the Federal Department of Justice issued a memorandum in 2009 (the “Ogden 
Memo”) that federal resources should not be used to prosecute individuals who are complying 
with their states’ laws (Ogden, 2014).    
MMLs could differentially impact crime and arrest rates depending on the particular 
policy dimensions the state enacts. MMLs often consist of a combination of the following policy 
dimensions: required patient registries, retail dispensaries, or in-home cultivation allowances 
(Table 2.1). States with mandatory patient registries require individuals seeking to use medical 
cannabis to register with the state. Typically, patients are required to provide evidence of their 
need for medical cannabis (including a doctor’s recommendation outlining the condition for 
which marijuana may provide relief).
1
 Patients, if approved, receive an identification card, which 
allows the state and law enforcement officials to easily differentiate between legitimate and 
illegitimate users, potentially dissuading the inappropriate use of medical marijuana (Pacula, 
                                                        
1
Chronic pain is the most (or second most) common reason for which medical marijuana is recommended (among 
states where registry information is publicly available). For instance, in Montana and Nevada, approximately 56 and 
63 percent of patients respectively cited chronic pain as the reason for medical marijuana use (Montana Department 
of Health and Human Services, 2016; Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health, 2016). In Arizona and 
Hawaii, over 70 percent of patients cited chronic pain (Arizona Department of Health Services, 2014; Hawaii 
Department of Health, 2015). In Colorado and Oregon, over 90 percent of patients cited chronic pain (Colorado 
Department of Public Health and Environment, 2016; Oregon Medical Marijuana Program, 2016). In New Jersey, 
chronic pain was the second most popular condition with 25 percent of patients reporting chronic pain (Department 
of Health Medical Marijuana Program, 2016).  
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Powell, Heaton, & Sevigny, 2015). Moreover, given that patient identification cards easily allow 
users to demonstrate legal possession of medical cannabis, registered patients may be more 
willing to report a theft or burglary to the police in the event their medical cannabis is stolen 
from them.  This would potentially contribute to an increase in reporting and a corresponding 
increase in arrests. In contrast, the issuance of patient identification cards may inadvertently 
result in patients or their households becoming attractive targets for criminals seeking marijuana, 
which becomes known via word of mouth or through internet postings (Crites, 2012; Moore, 
2011; Ricker, 2014).  States with mandatory registries saw a steady influx of applications; for 
instance, in the first year of the law, Arizona received and approved over 16,000 applications and 
currently has over 80,000 card holders (Arizona Department of Health Services, 2011, 2015).  
By the end of 2012, Colorado received over 200,000 new patient applications.2 Thus, the number 
of patients who could potentially become a victim of a proeprty crime in states with patient 
registries is non-trivial.  
In-home cultivation allowances permit qualified patients or their caregivers to grow 
medical cannabis at home. States individually specify the maximum number of mature and 
immature plants that may be cultivated at any one time (ProCon, 2015b).  Cultivation at home 
may pose one of the more difficult challenges in terms of law enforcement. The opportunity for 
spillovers into the recreational market exist as medical users may use or share their medical 
cannabis with others for recreational purposes; or they may cultivate more plants than is legally 
allowed (Bostwick, 2012; Pacula et al., 2015; Thurstone, Lieberman, & Schmiege, 2011). Thus, 
scarce police resources may be used to ensure households abide by the state’s plant limits and 
cultivation rules to prevent diversion into the recreational market, potentially allowing non-drug 
                                                        
2One estimate by ProCon (2015a) indicated that in 2014, among states with medical marijuana laws, an average of 
7.7 individuals per 1,000 state residents were legal medical marijuana users.  
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related crimes to continue undetected. Alternatively, since individuals have a ready supply of 
marijuana at home, they may rely less on purchases from illegal sources, reducing violent or 
property crimes associated with the black market. Or, such users may be more inclined to 
consume marijuana at home, decreasing crimes that may result from intoxicated confrontations 
in public spaces (e.g., at bars) (Anderson et al., 2013). 
Retail dispensaries are storefronts that sell medical marijuana and marijuana products 
(i.e., edibles, oils, tinctures, etc.) to qualified patients. Due to the federal classification of 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug in the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana is still illegal under 
federal law. The illegality of marijuana at the federal level means that financial institutions that 
depend on the Federal Reserve System’s money transfer system are barred from knowingly 
accepting money from marijuana sales (Stinson, 2015). To avoid criminal or civil liability, most 
financial institutions refuse to open bank accounts or accept money from the sale of marijuana. 
As a result, dispensaries are forced to operate as cash-only businesses (Michiels, 2014).  The 
substantial amount of drugs and cash on site could make dispensaries an attractive target for 
criminals (Kepple & Freisthler, 2012; Kovaleski, 2014; Morris et al., 2014; Nagourney & 
Lyman, 2013). Among the states that have legalized medical cannabis, two distinct policy 
approaches towards dispensaries have been implemented. In one version (e.g., Arizona, 
California, and Colorado), states permit a relatively open market. Aside from abiding by 
regulatory and licensing requirements (which may include licensing fees, security measures, 
background checks for staff, location parameters such as operating a certain distance from 
schools), the number of dispensaries allowed to operate in the state is not capped.  In such states, 
the number of dispensaries has proliferated to over 80 in Arizona and several hundred in 
California and Colorado by the end of 2014 (Arizona Department of Health Services, 2014; 
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Colorado Department of Revenue, 2015; NPR, 2009).3 In another version (e.g., Maine, New 
Jersey, and New Mexico), the state government determines and controls the maximum number 
of dispensaries that may operate within the state. This figure may be adjusted over time, but is 
subject to government approval. Often these states release a request for proposals to identify and 
select qualified retailers. Given the increased number of targets, crime and arrest rates may be 
more likely to increase in states that institute an unrestricted market for dispensaries relative to 
states with a restricted dispensary market or without dispensaries at all. 
MMLs may affect the arrest rate through two possible avenues. First, MMLs could 
change the crime rate, leading to corresponding changes in the arrest rate. For instance, by 
legalizing marijuana use under certain conditions and providing legal sources of marijuana, 
MMLs may undermine part of the black market, decreasing any violent or property crime that is 
associated with illicit drug market activities (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001; Montgomery, 2010; 
Morris et al., 2014). This, in turn, may lead to a reduced arrest rate. In contrast, however, certain 
features such as dispensaries might attract more crime, increasing the arrest rate. Second, 
changes in the arrest rate could be the result of changes in law enforcement levels due to MMLs 
(Chu, 2014). Depending on which criminal activities police choose to allocate their scarce 
resources, arrest rates may increase or decrease for certain types of crimes. Legalizing medical 
marijuana may reduce the need to monitor marijuana related offences (Chu 2014), freeing up 
resources to address other non-drug related crimes. Alternatively, since MMLs create additional 
rules, it is possible police resources will need to be continuously used to enforce drug laws, 
ensure medical marijuana does not spill over into the recreational market, or check that 
storefronts or home cultivation are not fronts for illegal drug sales. Sustained police monitoring 
                                                        
3Arizona’s first medical marijuana dispensaries opened in 2012, at which point three dispensaries were operating 
(Arizona Department of Health Services, 2012). Therefore, in this study, the impact of unrestricted dispensary 
policies is largely driven by Colorado and California. 
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of marijuana rules may increase the likelihood other crimes are left unchecked (Benson et al., 
1992, 2001; Resignato, 2000). 
 
Past Literature on MMLs, Arrests, and Crime 
 The literature looking specifically at medical marijuana legalization, crime, and arrest 
rates in the U.S. is limited. A handful of studies, however, have found that MMLs influence 
crime rates, but the direction of the effect varies depending on the scope and methodological 
approach of the study. Very few studies have looked at how arrest rates have changed as a result 
of MMLs. 
 Using the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data 
from 1988 to 2008, Chu (2014) examines marijuana possession arrests and finds that MMLs lead 
to an increase in the arrest rate for marijuana possession among males by 15 to 20 percent (after 
conditioning on California and Colorado). This study, however, is not a comprehensive study of 
the effects of MMLs on crime and arrest rates but rather a study of MMLs on illegal marijuana 
use.  Accordingly, Chu (2014) only focuses on one type of crime and on adult males aged 18 and 
over. 
 More attention has been paid to studying the effects of MMLs on crime rates rather than 
arrest rates.  Using the FBI UCR data (maintained the Bureau of Justice Statistics), Morris et al. 
(2014) examine the effect of MMLs on violent (i.e., murder, rape, robbery, assault) and property 
(i.e., burglary, larceny, and auto theft) crimes from 1990-2006.  Using a state- and year-fixed 
effects approach with the MML exposure variable measured as a trend (i.e., equal to the number 
of years the state’s MML was in effect), Morris et al. (2014) find that for every year MMLs were 
in place, murders and assaults decrease by an additional 2.4 percent. No significant effects are 
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identified for economically motivated crimes (such as robbery or burglary) or property crimes, 
leading Morris et al. to question the notion that MMLs might increase income-generating crimes.   
In a replication of the Morris et al. study, Alford (2014) uses the same data but a more 
recent timeframe (1995-2012) to study the impact of MMLs on crime.  She finds that states that 
adopted MMLs followed different crime rate trends than non-adopting states, highlighting the 
importance of controlling for state-specific linear time trends, which are not included in Morris 
et al.’s analysis.  After controlling for state-specific time trends, along with a number of 
observable state-level characteristics, Alford confirms that MMLs are associated with a decline 
in murder rates by approximately 10.6 percent.  Where Alford and Morris et al. differ is in their 
estimates of property and income-generating crimes. While Morris et al. finds insignificant 
negative effects of MMLs on property crimes, Alford estimates that burglary and larceny 
significantly increase by 8.0 and 6.2 percent respectively with MMLs.  In general, Alford finds 
that failing to control for state-specific time trends reverses the signs on the effect of MMLs on 
property crimes.  
 Another contribution of Alford’s paper (in light of work done by Pacula et al. (2015)) is 
the consideration of the individual MML policy dimensions, namely dispensaries and in-home 
cultivation allowances. Alford finds that, relative to states with no in-home cultivation, states that 
allowed home cultivation decrease robberies by 10.0 percent. In contrast, dispensaries increase 
robberies by 10.2 percent, offsetting the decrease in crime due to in-home cultivation.  
Dispensaries also increase the burglary and theft rate by 13.2 and 8.0 percent respectively.  
Home cultivation has no statistically significant impact on these crimes (Alford, 2014). While 
the consideration of the specific policy dimensions is notable, Alford did not consider the role of 
required patient registries. Moreover, Alford’s dispensary indicator is based on the date 
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dispensaries were permitted by law as opposed to the date dispensaries were actually operational 
within a state. As a result, the dispensary coefficients may not necessarily capture crime that 
resulted from storefronts open to the public.  
 A few other studies focus on the relationship between medical marijuana dispensaries and 
criminal activity. In a study of dispensaries in Sacramento, California using 2009 data from the 
Sacramento Police Department, Kepple and Freisthler (2012) find that the density of medical 
marijuana dispensaries is not significantly associated with violent or property crime rates. This 
study contravenes the conventional thinking that dispensaries may serve as an attractive target 
for criminals seeking money or drugs. However, this study focuses on the density of dispensaries 
at one point in time, rather than comparing crime rates before and after dispensaries were opened 
(the first legally protected dispensary opened in California in 2004). A second study of 
dispensaries in Sacramento shows that dispensaries that have security cameras and signs 
requiring patient identification cards have significantly lower levels of violence than dispensaries 
that do not have these security measures (Freisthler, Kepple, Sims, & Martin, 2013).  Having a 
doorman at the front of the dispensary also deters violent crime but not at conventionally 
significant levels (Freisthler et al., 2013). This study does not examine the effect of security 
measures on property crime. A third study, using the June 2010 closures of dispensaries in Los 
Angeles, finds that breaking and entering and assault (i.e., crimes sensitive to surveillance) 
increase after dispensaries close (Jacoboson et al., 2011). The authors suggest the on-site security 
provided by dispensaries deter crime in the surrounding area and subsequent closure of 
dispensaries may lead to an increase in crime in the community. This study, however, relied on a 
very limited time period (ten days before and after dispensary closures) and long-term trends 
may differ. 
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 In this study, I build on the existing literature by looking at arrest rates (rather than crime 
rates) between juveniles and adults, examining the effect of patient registries, in-home 
cultivation, and legally protected dispensaries on the ground, and consider the mechanisms 
through which MMLs impact arrest rates. 
 
III. Data and Empirical Specification 
Data  
This study employs data collected by the FBI UCR program and maintained by National 
Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ).  The data are available through the Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention website (Puzzanchera & Kang, 2014).4  The NCJJ database 
provides information on yearly state-level arrest rates from 1994 to 2012. During this timeframe, 
MMLs came into effect in 18 states (Table 2.1). 
The UCR program collects arrest data from thousands of law enforcement agencies on a 
monthly basis. The NCJJ then calculates annual state-level estimates of arrest rates. However, 
the NCJJ only reports data in a given year if a state’s coverage indicator is at least 90 percent.  
The coverage indicator represents the proportion of the state population for which information 
was available and for which imputation was not required. For example, a coverage indicator of 
100 percent means that all agencies reported to the UCR program for the entire year and no 
imputation was required. A coverage indicator of 90 percent implies either that not all agencies 
reported, agencies reported for only part of the year, or a combination of both. In such a case, the 
NCJJ imputes the arrest rate for the remaining 10 percent of the population (Puzzanchera & 
Kang, 2014). Since the NCJJ does not impute arrest rates for states falling below the 90 percent 
                                                        
4The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention data are available at http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/. 
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coverage indicator, there are some states and years with missing data.5 Seventeen of the 18 states 
that passed MMLs between 1994 and 2012 have sufficient information, though some states are 
missing observations in some years (N=73 missing observations). One state (Washington) did 
not have any data available for the years covered in the study (N=19) and is excluded from the 
sample. Among the 33 non-adopting states, 28 have sufficient data (with N=165 missing 
observations) and five states (Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, and Ohio) did not meet the 
coverage indicator in any year and are excluded from this analysis (N=95). The final analytic 
sample is an unbalanced panel consisting of 45 (17 MML and 28 non-MML) states, with 617 
state-year observations (of a possible total of 969 state-year observations). Consequently, the 
results of this analysis should be interpreted as an average treatment effect for the states included 
in the sample (rather than generalizable to the entire U.S.).  
 
Measures 
Arrest Rates. Arrest rates for violent and property crimes are available for three age 
groups: all ages, adults (18 years and over), and juveniles (age 10 to 17 years). The rates are 
reported as the number of arrests made per 100,000 individuals in the referent population. 
Violent crimes include murder, rape, robbery, and assault. Property crimes include burglary, 
theft, and auto theft.6 Definitions for each of these crimes can be found in Appendix Table 1. 
                                                        
5According to the NCJJ, the lower the coverage indicator, the less likely the imputed arrest rates would reflect arrest 
activity in a given jurisdiction.  Thus, only those jurisdictions with arrest rates at or above 90% are displayed in the 
Easy Access to FBI Arrest Statistics database (Puzzanchera & Kang, 2014). 
 
6Arson arrest rates are available in the NCJJ data; however, arson is excluded from the list of property crimes in this 
study as it is not typically considered an income-producing crime (Pacula & Kilmer, 2003).  This study focuses on 
income-generating property crimes as they are theoretically linked to marijuana consumption and availability. 
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Medical Marijuana Laws. In many prior studies, MML enactment has been measured 
using a binary indicator equal to one when a MML came into effect in a given state.  As noted by 
Pacula et al. (2015), however, the use of a binary variable masks the potentially heterogeneous 
effects of the various policy dimensions that make up a state’s medical marijuana program.  As a 
result, this study focuses on the effect of individual MML policy dimensions (i.e., dispensaries, 
registries, and in-home cultivation) on arrest rates. State implementation of dispensaries, 
registries, and in-home cultivation are measured as three binary indicators that equal one when 
the respective policy dimension comes into effect. Note that many states adopt or implement 
these dimensions at different times, and enactment of these dimensions does not always 
correspond with the date the state enacts its MML policy. These indicators take on fractional 
values if the policy takes effect part way through the year. Information on whether a state 
adopted any of these policy dimensions, and when they take effect, was drawn from ProCon.org 
and news releases.  Any conflicting information, or information unavailable from any other 
source, was verified or obtained by contacting state officials directly.7 
The dispensary variable measures legally protected dispensaries that were in operation in 
a given state. Since there is often a lag between the passage date of legislation permitting 
dispensaries and the actual opening of a medical marijuana dispensary, the dispensary variable in 
this study equals one when the first legal dispensary opened. As dispensaries may serve as 
targets for criminal activities, the focus is on measuring the effect of having physical storefronts 
that sell medical marijuana and are open to the public. Furthermore, the MML dispensary 
variable only includes legally protected dispensaries, although news reports have identified de 
facto dispensaries in states where storefronts were not permitted (Anderson & Rees, 2014b; 
                                                        
7The dates included in this study largely correspond with the implementation dates reported by Pacula et al. (2015) 
and Wen et al. (2015). 
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Nagourney & Lyman, 2013; Wieczner, 2013). However, following the approach of Pacula et al. 
(2015), the dispensary measure captures those storefronts that were legally protected, since any 
state with or without legal medical marijuana laws may still find illegal de facto storefront 
dispensaries operating within its borders. 
During the study period, six states opened legally protected medical marijuana 
dispensaries at various times (Table 2.1). In states with required patient registries, medical 
marijuana users must apply for an identification card from the state in order to legally possess 
and consume medical marijuana; 15 states mandated patient registries.  Lastly, in states that 
permitted in-home cultivation, approved patients or caregivers are allowed to grow a certain 
number of plants at home; 14 states allowed in-home cultivation. 
Covariates. A number of time-varying covariates are included in the models to control 
for any state-level characteristics that may influence both the state’s propensity to adopt MMLs 
and arrest rates. State-level demographic characteristics are obtained from the March Supplement 
of the Current Population Survey (CPS), which are managed and disseminated by the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) (Flood, King, Ruggles, & Warren, 2015).8  Specifically, 
the analysis controls for the proportion of the state population that is 45-64 years old; proportion 
that have at least a college degree; proportion of the population that is Black; proportion of the 
population that is Hispanic; and the proportion living below the poverty level.  The analysis also 
controls for the state unemployment rate, which is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.9  
A binary indicator for whether a state had previously decriminalized marijuana is also included 
(Markowitz, 2005).  These covariates are selected based on previous studies that demonstrated a 
relationship between these demographic characteristics and crime and arrest rates (Benson et al., 
                                                        
8The IPUMS-CPS data are available at https://cps.ipums.org/cps/index.shtml  
9Unemployment rate are available at http://www.bls.gov/data/#unemployment.  
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2001; Ihlanfeldt, 2007; Markowitz et al., 2012; Morris et al., 2014; Peterson, Krivo, & Harris, 
2000).10   
Lastly, a variable measuring beer consumption per capita in gallons is included in the 
analysis. There is a strong documented relationship between alcohol and crime (and arrest rates) 
(Cook & Moore, 1993; Markowitz, 2005; Markowitz et al., 2012; Popovici, Homer, Fang, & 
French, 2012) and evidence from natural experiments that marijuana and alcohol are substitutes 
(Anderson et al., 2013; Anderson & Rees, 2014a; Crost & Guerrero, 2012; DiNardo & Lemieux, 
2001).  Neglecting to control for alcohol consumption would result in estimates on the effect of 
MML policy dimensions that capture the effect of alcohol.  To isolate the effect of MML policy 
dimensions independent of alcohol consumption (and alcohol-induced crimes), the models 
include a measure of state beer consumption per capita. Beer consumption is used since it is the 
most popular alcoholic beverage among Americans (World Health Organization, 2014).  Beer 
consumption per capita is obtained from the Brewers Almanac (Beer Institute, 2013). 
 
Analytic Approach 
 To identify the effect of state implementation of MMLs on arrest rates, I use a state-fixed 
effects model estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).  This approach exploits within-state 
variation to control for unobserved time-invariant factors that may otherwise bias the estimated 
effect of MMLs on arrest rates.  The state-fixed effects control for time invariant differences 
between states while state-specific time trends are included to control for changes over time. 
                                                        
10Furthermore, these covariates had substantial within-state variation over time and accounted for additional 
variation in addition to state-specific linear time trends. 
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MMLs, however, are not uniform across states.  As a result, measuring MMLs as a binary 
indicator (as in equation (1)) represents a naïve approach to estimating the relationship between 
state MMLs and arrest rates:  
   (           )                                    (1) 
This approach is problematic as it masks the heterogeneity of MMLs across adopting states 
(Alford, 2014; Pacula et al., 2015).  States with MMLs implement different combinations of 
policy dimensions (i.e., dispensaries, registries, and in-home cultivation), and depending on 
which policy dimensions a state selects, some versions of MMLs may decrease arrest rates, while 
others may increase it.  Moreover, states implement different policy components at different 
times. That is, no state had all three policy dimensions in effect at the same time (see Table 2.1).  
Consequently, a binary MML variable does not represent a uniform policy effect and would not 
accurately depict the various combinations of policy dimensions implemented in each state.  
Thus, while the results of equation (1) are presented in Table 2.8, any significant effects 
identified by the binary MML variable are considered suspect. 
 Instead, the appropriate approach to evaluating the effects of MMLs is to estimate the 
independent effects of the individual policy dimensions, as recommended by Pacula et al. (2015). 
Accordingly, the preferred approach is to estimate the following equation that includes three 
separate indicators for each of the three MML policy dimensions: 
   (           )                                                   
               . (2) 
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The outcome of interest is the log of the arrest rate for one of seven violent or property crimes,11 
where the arrest rate is the number of arrests per 100,000 people in the referent population group. 
Dispensaryst is a binary variable that is set equal to one in the year a state first opened a legally 
operating dispensary. Registryst is a binary indicator that equals one when a state mandated a 
required patient registry. InHomest is a binary indicator that equals one in the year a state 
permitted cultivation of medical cannabis at home. Zst represents a vector of time-varying state 
characteristics that may influence the arrest rate. Specifically, Zst contains the proportion of the 
state population aged 45-64; proportion with a college degree; proportion of the population that 
is black; proportion of the population that is Hispanic; proportion of the population under the 
poverty line; beer consumption per capita in gallons; the state unemployment rate; and an 
indicator for whether the state previously decriminalized marijuana. Lastly,    denotes state-
fixed effects. Examination of the unadjusted logged arrest rates revealed differential trends 
between MML states and non-MML states.12 Accordingly, a state-specific linear time trend 
(        ) is included in all models to relax the common trends assumption typically required 
for identification in a fixed effects model (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The state-specific linear 
time trend also controls for the changes due to time within each state. Models (1) and (2) are run 
separately for the all ages, adult, and juvenile samples. All estimates are weighted using the 
average state population over the study period for the corresponding age group, and standard 
errors are clustered at the state level (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004).   
To further explore the impact dispensaries have on arrest rates, I re-estimate equation (2) 
for all age groups replacing the dispensary variable with two new dispensary variables reflecting 
                                                        
11The log of the arrest rate is used, as the arrest data are right-skewed.  This specification also ensured normally 
distributed residuals, which is required for hypothesis tests to be valid. 
 
12Figures of the logged arrest rate trends are available upon request. 
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the two types of policy frameworks established to regulate the number of dispensaries. Among 
the six states that had legally protected dispensaries in operation between 1994 and 2012, three 
states implemented an unrestricted market where the number of dispensaries proliferated, 
whereas the other three states introduced a more tightly controlled dispensary market.13 The first 
dispensary variable added to the model (“unrestricted dispensary”) indicates whether a state 
allowed a more open market for dispensaries (i.e., aside from following state licensing rules and 
regulations, the number of dispensaries allowed to operate is relatively unrestricted).  The second 
dispensary variable (“restricted dispensary”) represents states that permitted only a pre-
determined number of medical marijuana dispensaries. Since dispensaries may serve as easy 
targets for property crimes, states that permit an open market for dispensaries might experience 
greater increases in arrest rates than states that operate a restricted market.  
In some of the years, a few states have zero arrests for certain crimes, particularly for the 
low-incident crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery.14 Since the log of zero is undefined, the 
models dropped these observations, reducing the analytic sample size for murder, rape, and 
robbery. To check the sensitivity of the results to the omission of these observations, equation (2) 
is rerun using non-logged arrest rates as the outcome so that the state-years with an arrest rate of 
zero are retained.  
There are two potential mechanisms through which MMLs can affect arrest rates. First, 
MMLs could lead to a change in crime levels, thus affecting the arrest rate. Second, MMLs could 
change the level of law enforcement, enforcement effort, or the allocation of law enforcement 
                                                        
13The three states with an unrestricted dispensary policy are Arizona, California, and Colorado.  The three states 
with a restricted dispensary policy are Maine, New Jersey, and New Mexico. 
 
14The number of state-years with a murder arrest rate of zero is 10 in both the all ages and adult samples, and 92 for 
the juvenile sample.  The number of state-years with a rape arrest rate of zero is 2 for the juvenile sample.  The 
number of state-years with a robbery arrest rate of zero is 1 for both the all ages and adult samples, and 2 for the 
juvenile sample.  The resulting sample sizes can be seen in Table 2.4. 
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resources, increasing the arrest rate for crimes to which resources were allocated. To determine 
which mechanism is acting on arrest rates, two sensitivity checks are run: first, I include a 
measure of law enforcement (LE) in equation (2); and second, I compare the arrest rates to 
changes in the crime rates. 
LE is measured as the number of sworn police officers per 1,000 persons.15  Inclusion of 
a LE variable serves two functions: first, the inclusion of the LE variable serves as a sensitivity 
check of the results after including a potentially endogenous variable (since MMLs may induce a 
change in law enforcement levels); second, inclusion of the LE variable controls for the effect of 
increased police surveillance on the probability of getting arrested. After controlling for law 
enforcement levels, the estimated impact of the MML policy variables would largely reflect 
changes in criminal activity on arrest rates.  
To further explore whether the changes in arrest rates are the result of changes in crime 
levels rather than changes in law enforcement, model (2) is re-estimated using the logged crime 
rate from 1994-2012, using FBI UCR data maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS).  
These data estimate the crime rate (rather than the arrest rate) based on the number of crimes 
reported to police at the state level and are recorded as the crime rate per 100,000 persons. If the 
coefficients from the BJS models operate in the same direction as the primary arrest models, this 
would indicate that the changes in arrest rates are likely due to changes in the crime rate.   
 
 
                                                        
15The number of sworn police officers was obtained from Table 77 of the annual UCR reports, available on the FBI 
website (https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications#Crime). Law enforcement officers were defined as 
individuals who have arrest powers, carry a badge and firearm, and are paid from government funds reserved for 
sworn law enforcement officers; this does not include civilian employees in the police service (e.g., correctional 
officers, radio dispatchers, meter attendants, etc.). 
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IV. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics show that the implementation of MMLs is associated with a 
lower murder arrest rate for all ages (Table 2.2A), adults (Table 2.2B) and juveniles (Table 
2.2C).  For juveniles only, MML enactment is associated with a lower level of all other violent 
and property crime arrest rates (except robbery). 
 These differences in means, however, do not account for the various observed and 
unobserved state-level factors that may influence arrest rates. Indeed several state-level 
characteristics significantly differed by MML implementation status (Table 2.3). The unadjusted 
associations also do not reflect the various MML policy dimensions, which could differentially 
influence arrest rates. Accordingly, the following sections report the estimated effect of MML 
policy dimensions on arrest rates conditional on a number of observed and unobserved state-
level characteristics. 
 
MML Policy Dimensions and Arrests for Violent Crime 
 In the results from the preferred models that examine each policy dimension, legally 
operating dispensaries have the most notable impact on certain violent crime arrest rates (Table 
2.4). In particular, holding all else equal, a state with a dispensary significantly increases the 
robbery arrest rate among adults and juveniles relative to states that do not have legally protected 
dispensaries (Table 2.4, column 4). Among adults, dispensaries lead to an increase in robbery 
arrest rates by 14.6 percent, while the juvenile robbery arrest rate is increased by 35.7 percent.16 
The magnitude of these estimated results are generally in line with the effect sizes found by 
                                                        
16These percentage changes are calculated using    ( )   . 
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Alford (2014) and Chu (2014). These findings are also consistent with media reports that 
dispensaries have been attractive targets for income-generating crimes (Montgomery, 2010; 
Nagourney & Lyman, 2013; Volz, 2010). Dispensaries do not significantly impact the arrest rate 
for any other type of violent crimes, other than the murder rate. In this case, dispensaries lead to 
an increase in the murder arrest rate, but only among adults. However, murder is a low-incident 
arrest rate, as seen in Table 2.2; thus, small changes in the arrest rate correspond with large 
percentage changes and should be interpreted with caution.17     
 
MML Policy Dimensions and Arrests for Property Crime 
 Turning to property crime arrests, states with legally operating dispensaries generally 
experience an increase in arrest rates for each type of property crime compared to states without 
legal dispensaries (Table 2.5). While dispensaries lead to an increase in the theft arrest rate for 
adults and juveniles by 16.3 percent and 8.8 percent respectively (Table 2.5, column 3), the 
burglary (column 2) and auto theft (column 4) arrest rates increase significantly only among 
adults. These findings suggest that adults are the main drivers behind the increase in property 
crime arrest rates when dispensaries are open. The increased property crime arrest rates are in 
line with the notion that dispensaries act as prime targets for income-generating crimes such as 
burglary and theft. 
 Required patient registries also increase burglary and theft arrest rates relative to states 
without required registries but only among the adult sample. States with registries experienced an 
                                                        
17Though the independent effects of these policy dimensions were statistically significant for some arrest rates, 
these results should be interpreted with some caution.  These policy dimensions do not exist in isolation; rather, 
states often implement a combination of these dimensions when instituting their MMLs.  In fact, no state had a 
legally operating dispensary without already having either in-home cultivation or a required patient registry already 
in place.  Thus, the dispensary coefficient should be interpreted with caution and as an offsetting effect to one of the 
other policy dimensions.  
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increase in the adult arrest rate for burglary and theft by 15.9 and 11.6 percent respectively 
(Table 2.5, columns 2 and 3). In contrast, the impact of registries on juvenile arrest rates for 
burglary and theft are negative though not statistically significant. The increase in theft and 
burglary arrest rates among adults may potentially be explained by the implications of having a 
registry rather than the registry itself. For instance, with registries, patients are afforded legal 
protections to possess medical marijuana in their home or on their person. These individuals or 
persons may then be targeted for property crimes, particularly if knowledge of their possession 
becomes known by word of mouth (Ricker, 2014; Trotter, 2014). Furthermore, the patient 
registry essentially creates a property right to medical marijuana. As a result, registered patients 
who were victims of property crimes (i.e., had their medical marijuana stolen) may be more 
inclined to report crimes involving marijuana than before registries were established, potentially 
contributing to an increase in arrests for theft and burglary (Moore, 2011). An alternative 
explanation may be related to the lag between permitting medical marijuana use and the creation 
of legal avenues to obtain marijuana in many states (Alford, 2014). Due to the lack of legal 
sources for medical cannabis, patients would have to resort to illegal means to obtain marijuana, 
perpetuating the underground market and the property crime associated with it (Washington 
State Department of Health, 2008). 
 Compared to states without in-home cultivation allowances, states that permit in-home 
cultivation experience a decrease in arrest rates for select property crimes. Auto theft arrest rates 
decrease significantly for both adults and juveniles (Table 2.5, column 4). In-home cultivation 
also leads to a statistically significantly decline in the theft arrest rate but only among adults 
(Table 2.5, column 3). This decline in arrest rates suggests the enactment of in-home cultivation 
may have offset the increase in property crime arrests that occurred due to dispensaries and 
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registries. It is possible that by having a supply of marijuana at home, this reduces the need for 
users to commit property crimes to generate revenue for drugs or to source marijuana from the 
illicit market. 
 
Restricted versus Unrestricted Dispensaries 
 The proliferation of medical marijuana dispensaries may affect crime and arrest rates due 
to an increased number of potential targets for crime.  Certain states place a cap on the number of 
medical marijuana dispensaries that are legally allowed to operate.  Other states permit a more 
open market whereby an interested business is allowed to apply for a business license to operate 
a medical marijuana dispensary, provided they abide by certain regulations (i.e., payment of a 
licensing fee, security measures, operating a certain distance from schools, etc.).  In such 
unrestricted markets, the number of dispensaries have proliferated (e.g., by the end of 2012, 
Colorado had nearly 300 licensed medical marijuana dispensaries across the state (Colorado 
Department of Revenue, 2015)) potentially creating more opportunities for crime or more 
facilities to monitor for illegal activity.  In contrast, Maine, for instance, permits only 8 
dispensaries to operate (Maine Department of Health and Human Services, 2013).  
With respect to violent crimes, states with an unrestricted dispensary market experience a 
statistically significant increase in the murder and robbery arrest rates for adults and juveniles 
(Table 2.6, columns 2 and 4). In contrast, enacting a controlled dispensary market does not result 
in statistically significant differences in the violent crime arrest rates.18 Among the six states 
with operational dispensaries within the study period, these findings suggest that the increased 
                                                        
18To determine whether the effect of unrestricted dispensaries was different from restricted dispensaries, I tested 
whether the coefficient on unrestricted dispensary was equal to the coefficient on restricted dispensary.  The null 
hypothesis was that the two coefficients are equal.  The tests rejected the null hypothesis of equality for the all age 
murder arrest rate, and the robbery arrest rate for all three samples, confirming that the two coefficients were 
statistically different at the 0.05 level.  
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violent crime (murder and arrest rates) were largely driven by the states that allowed a more open 
market for dispensaries to operate.  
Turning to property crime arrest rates, states that implement an unrestricted dispensary 
policy again experience increases in various arrest rates for property crimes relative to states 
without dispensaries (Table 2.7). Unrestricted dispensary policies result in a statistically 
significant increase in the theft arrest rate for both adults and juveniles (column 3), while 
burglary and auto theft arrest rate increased only among adults (columns 2 and 4). In contrast, 
relative to states without dispensaries, states with restricted dispensary policies largely do not 
experience any increase in property crime arrest rates. The exception was auto theft, where states 
with restricted dispensary policies experienced a statistically significant increase in the auto theft 
rate among adults and juveniles (column 4). For burglary and theft, however, tests of equality 
indicate that unrestricted dispensary policies indeed result in larger positive effects on arrest rates 
than restricted dispensary policies for both adults and juveniles. These results indicate that 
increases in property crime arrest rates were likely driven primarily by states with unrestricted 
dispensary policies. 
These results should be interpreted with caution, however, since specifying two separate 
dispensary variables reduces the number of states that are used to estimate each dispensary 
coefficient.  That is, only three states had an open dispensary market and three states had a 
controlled market in the analytic sample, so the estimates rely on limited variation.19 
Nevertheless, these results can be viewed as preliminary evidence of the effect of having a 
restricted or unrestricted dispensary market on arrest rates. 
 
                                                        
19Many of the dispensaries also open near the end of the time period studied, again limiting the number of “post-
dispensary” years to derive estimates. 
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V. Sensitivity Analysis 
Sample Size Attrition 
 A few of the state-year observations reported an arrest rate of zero for murder, rape, and 
robbery. Since the outcome of interest was the logged arrest rate, this resulted in a small number 
of observations being dropped from the samples, depending on the type of crime (reductions in 
sample size ranged from 1 to 92 observations). To determine whether the reduction in sample 
size affects the results, equation (2) is re-estimated using the non-logged arrest rate as the 
outcome, which retained all 617 observations. With respect to violent crimes, the non-logged 
estimates are comparable to the logged results in both direction and significance (Table 2.9). One 
notable difference is seen in the juvenile murder arrest rate, which has the largest reduction in 
sample size in the logged model.  In the non-logged results, the increase in the juvenile murder 
arrest rate due to dispensaries is statistically significant whereas it is insignificant in the logged 
estimates. Despite this, the direction of effects on the juvenile murder arrest rate is consistent in 
both models. Overall, the reduction in sample size does not appear to substantially alter the 
interpretation of results for violent crime arrest rates.   
 The non-logged models for violent crime arrests were also run using the reduced sample 
used in the logged models for violent crime arrest rates (see Table 2.4 for corresponding sample 
sizes). No substantial differences exist between the full and reduced samples for the non-logged 
estimates (results available upon request), supporting the conclusion that the reduced sample size 
does not greatly impact the interpretation of the logged models. 
 The data for the property crime arrest rates do not suffer from sample size attrition.  
Accordingly, the non-logged estimates confirm the direction and significance of the logged 
estimates (Table 2.10). One difference is the effect of in-home cultivation becomes statistically 
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significant for both the adult and juvenile burglary arrest rates in the non-logged model whereas 
it is insignificant in the logged models. Nevertheless, these results support the conclusions drawn 
from the logged models for property crime arrest rates.  
 
Mechanisms Linking MML Policy Dimensions and Arrest Rates 
 MML policy dimensions can impact arrest rates through one of two mechanisms: by 
changing the level of police resources made available to monitor other non-drug crimes or by 
changing the level of crimes committed. By controlling for law enforcement levels, the effect of 
the MML policy dimensions would largely reflect changes in crimes committed. The estimated 
relationships between the MML policy dimensions and arrest rates are generally robust to the 
inclusion of a LE variable. In the violent and property crime arrest rate models, controlling for 
LE results in coefficients that are qualitatively similar to the main estimates (Table 2.11 and 
Table 2.12).  The lack of meaningful differences between the estimates with and without LE 
suggests that the policy dimensions influenced arrest rates through a corresponding impact on 
crime rates rather than changes in police resources.   
To further explore whether the changes in the arrest rates are a reflection of changes in 
criminal activity or changes in police resources, I compare the all ages arrest rates to estimates of 
the crime rates using FBI UCR data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) (N=969). 
If MML enactment leads to a reallocation of policing resources away from drug law enforcement 
and towards monitoring and deterring other crimes, then an increase in arrest rates would likely 
accompany a decrease in the estimated crime rates. In contrast, if the changes in arrest rates were 
a response to changes in crime rates, the arrest rates and crime rates should move in the same 
direction.   
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Looking at violent crime rates for all ages, the presence of dispensaries significantly 
increases the murder and robbery crime rates relative to states without dispensaries (Table 2.13, 
columns 1 to 5). This suggests that the increase in murder and robbery arrest rates due to 
dispensaries is likely a response to a corresponding increase in crime levels. In contrast, states 
with in-home cultivation allowances experience declines in the crime rates for murder, robbery 
and assault relative to states without in-home cultivation allowances, but there was no 
statistically significant change in arrest rates for these crimes. This suggests that although crimes 
decreased in states with in-home cultivation (relative to states without in-home cultivation), 
police may have maintained pre-established levels of surveillance on these violent crimes. 
Registries are associated with a statistically significant increase in rape, robbery, and 
assault crime rates relative to states without registries. However, registries do not lead to a 
corresponding change in the arrest rates for these crimes. In this case, the lack of change in arrest 
rates despite significant increases in crime rates due to registries may be explained by a 
continued need to enforce MML registry rules and ensure marijuana users were legitimate 
medical users (Wieczner, 2013). That is, in states with required patient registries, police 
resources may not have been made available to make arrests for these violent crimes due to their 
need to monitor MML compliance.  
Turning to property crime rates, changes in property crime arrest rates more closely 
mirror changes in the property crime arrest rates (Table 2.13, columns 6 to 9). States with 
dispensaries, relative to states without dispensaries, experience a statistically significant increase 
in the burglary, theft, and auto theft crime rates, which correspond with statistically significant 
increases in the arrest rates for these crimes. Similarly, the effect of registries significantly 
increases both crime rates and arrest rates for burglaries. Registries also lead to an increase 
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(though statistically insignificant) in theft and auto theft crime rates, which was consistent with 
the positive effect of registries on these arrest rates. Compared to not permitting in-home 
cultivation, home cultivation decreases the crime rate and arrest rate for property crimes, though 
most coefficients are not significant at conventional levels. The similarities between the changes 
in crime rates and arrest rates support the interpretation that MML policy dimensions influence 
property arrest rates by changing the level of crime rather than by shifting policing resources. 
Taken together, it is likely that many of the increases in arrest rates are due to 
corresponding increases in crime rates. Though, these results cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that changes in police resource allocation had a partial impact on the changes (or lack 
of changes) in the arrest rates, especially with respect to violent crimes. While I have controlled 
for LE levels, I am not able to measure on which crime areas police resources are focused.  
Therefore, I am not able to confirm with certainty as to whether MMLs divert police resources 
away from non-drug related crimes. Nevertheless, this analysis provides some evidence that 
crimes (particularly property crimes) increased with the introduction of certain MML policy 
dimensions, and arrest rates increased accordingly.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
This study examines the impact of various aspects of MMLs on arrest rates for a number 
of violent and property crimes in the U.S.  In doing so, this study adds to the literature on the 
externalities associated with MML implementation in three ways.  First, this study examines the 
effects of MMLs on arrest rates by age, for adults and juveniles; second, this is the first known 
study to examine the differential impact of state policies on dispensaries (i.e., restricted versus 
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unrestricted dispensary markets); and third, this study considers the different mechanisms 
through which MML policy dimensions impact arrest rates.  
With the exception of robbery arrest rates, the adult population is responsible for most of 
the changes in violent and property crime arrest rates.  Such a finding may alert policymakers 
and law enforcement officials in states that have enacted or will enact MMLs, particularly those 
with dispensaries and registries, to divert most resources towards deterring criminal activity 
among the adult population. 
The results of this study also indicate which specific MML policy dimensions lead to 
increases in arrest rates. Legally protected dispensaries and required patient registries are shown 
to increase arrest rates, especially for property crimes. In particular, the increase in arrest rates 
due to dispensaries is primarily driven by states with unrestricted dispensary markets. This is 
consistent with media reports that dispensaries have acted as targets for income-generating 
crimes, such as robberies, burglary, and theft (Nagourney & Lyman, 2013; Volz, 2010; 
Wieczner, 2013). To curtail the increase in crime, state policymakers may consider 
implementing additional restrictions on the number of dispensaries that may be allowed to 
operate within the state, as states with restricted dispensary markets experience no significant 
changes in arrest rates relative to states without dispensaries. Moreover, policy changes that 
allow dispensaries to open accounts with banks so that they do not have to operate as cash-only 
businesses may decrease the attractiveness of dispensaries as a target.  
Conversely, in-home cultivation offsets the increase in arrest rates suggesting beneficial 
outcomes associated with allowing individuals to cultivate medical marijuana at home. This, 
however, should not be interpreted as a wholesale endorsement of in-home cultivation 
allowances since other negative externalities may result from such a provision. Further study and 
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consideration of potential spillovers into the recreational market (Bostwick, 2012; Thurstone et 
al., 2011) and impacts on other health behaviours and social outcomes need to be considered 
before determining the full array of benefits and drawbacks of in-home cultivation.   
The primary mechanism through which MML policy dimensions impact arrest rates 
appears to be through their impact on the crime rate. In turn, the crime rate may have increased 
for several reasons. For instance, crime rates may have increased due to the establishment of new 
targets for crime (i.e., dispensaries). Alternatively, crimes unrelated to drug use or possession 
may have increased because police resources are required to enforce MML rules, prevent 
spillovers into the recreational market, verify that users are legitimate medical patients, and 
ensure dispensaries or in-home cultivators are not fronts for grow-ops (Chu, 2014; Nagourney & 
Lyman, 2013; Volz, 2010; Wieczner, 2013). These changes in crime associated with the 
enactment of various MML policy dimensions are likely the main drivers of changes in arrest 
rates. 
 This study benefits from a long timeframe from 1994 to 2012, which includes the first 
state to adopt an MML as well as the first six states to open dispensaries to the public. One 
drawback of the study is the attrition in the NCJJ dataset, which limits the generalizability of 
results to those states included in the sample. Nevertheless, these results provide insights as to 
the expected impacts of different types of MMLs on crime and arrest rates. The results of this 
study provide guidance on the design features of MMLs to states considering the legalization of 
medical cannabis. The lessons learned from the medical marijuana experience can also inform 
the creation of legal recreational markets, as many of the features of MMLs can be transferred to 
a recreational market. While legal markets hypothetically reduce arrests for most marijuana 
possession charges, new opportunities for criminal activity may arise. Policymakers can thus 
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take precautionary action to safeguard against increases in crime and arrest rates that may arise 
from legalizing medical (or recreational) marijuana. 
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Table 2.1 States with medical marijuana laws, policy dimensions, and effective date, 
1994-2012 
State 
MML in 
Effect 
1st Legal 
Dispensary 
Opened 
Required 
Patient 
Registry 
In-Home 
Cultivation 
Allowed 
Alaska 1999 
 
1999 1999 
Arizona 2011 2012† 2011 2011 
California 1996 2004† 
 
1996 
Colorado 2001 2004† 2001 2001 
Connecticut 2012 
 
2012 
 District of Columbia 2010 
 
2010 
 Delaware 2011 
 
2011 
 Hawaii 2000 
 
2000 2000 
Maine 1999 2011 2009 1999 
Michigan 2008 
  
2008 
Montana 2004 
 
2011 2004 
Nevada 2001 
 
2001 2001 
New Jersey 2010 2012 2010 
 New Mexico 2007 2009 2007 2007 
Oregon 1998 
 
2007 1998 
Rhode Island 2006 
 
2006 2006 
Vermont 2004 
 
2004 2004 
Washington 1998     1998 
Notes: Dispensaries with a † indicate that the state permits an open dispensary market.  All other states put 
limits on the number of dispensaries that may operate within the state.  In Colorado, the first reported 
dispensary open in 2004; however a majority of the dispensaries did not open until 2009/2010 (Anderson 
and Rees, 2014b; Weinstein, 2010). 
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Table 2.2A Descriptive statistics of arrest rates (per 100,000) for all ages by MML implementation status 
 
Full Sample MML=0 MML=1 
   Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.   
All Ages 
       Overall Violent Crime 176.78 (12.86) 178.72 (12.45) 169.84 (31.99) 0 
Murder  4.18 (0.38) 4.50 (0.44) 3.03 (0.52) ** 
Rape 9.22 (0.51) 9.52 (0.61) 8.13 (0.70) 0 
Robbery 34.27 (3.50) 35.31 (3.97) 30.56 (5.37) 0 
Assault 129.12 (10.00) 129.42 (8.96) 128.03 (27.47) 0 
Overall Property Crime 614.73 (22.94) 628.89 (24.23) 564.19 (39.08) * 
Burglary 96.84 (5.74) 98.22 (5.95) 91.93 (11.48) 0 
Theft 470.58 (19.36) 483.97 (19.91) 422.78 (36.01) * 
Auto Theft 41.44 (3.50) 40.74 (3.54) 43.95 (5.98) 0 
N 617 
 
482 
 
135 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.               
Notes: Estimates are unweighted and clustered at the state level. 
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Table 2.2B Descriptive statistics of arrest rates (per 100,000) for adults by MML implementation status 
 
Full Sample MML=0 MML=1 
   Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.   
Adults 
       Overall Violent Crime 196.75 (14.95) 197.07 (13.76) 195.59 (39.35) 0 
Murder  5.01 (0.44) 5.36 (0.51) 3.76 (0.63) ** 
Rape 10.32 (0.56) 10.62 (0.66) 9.25 (0.86) 0 
Robbery 33.83 (3.26) 34.57 (3.58) 31.20 (5.41) 0 
Assault 147.63 (12.24) 146.57 (10.50) 151.42 (34.82) 0 
Overall Property Crime 563.32 (23.37) 571.41 (24.81) 534.41 (38.42) 0 
Burglary 89.02 (6.20) 89.46 (6.35) 87.44 (12.38) 0 
Theft 434.50 (18.73) 444.00 (19.31) 400.58 (34.49) 0 
Auto Theft 36.08 (3.52) 34.16 (3.16) 42.95 (6.67) 0 
N 617 
 
482 
 
135 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.               
Notes: Estimates are unweighted and clustered at the state level. 
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Table 2.2C Descriptive statistics of arrest rates (per 100,000) for juveniles by MML implementation 
status 
 
Full Sample MML=0 MML=1 
   Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.   
Juveniles 
       Overall Violent Crime 257.96 (20.99) 272.47 (24.54) 206.13 (30.42) * 
Murder  3.80 (0.40) 4.24 (0.46) 2.21 (0.52) *** 
Rape 13.03 (1.01) 13.73 (1.26) 10.53 (0.82) ** 
Robbery 79.23 (10.56) 83.78 (12.54) 62.96 (13.53) 0 
Assault 161.90 (11.57) 170.71 (13.20) 130.46 (18.77) * 
Overall Property Crime 1666.70 (82.56) 1736.73 (97.49) 1416.67 (106.75) ** 
Burglary 261.64 (13.42) 271.30 (15.29) 227.17 (24.93) * 
Theft 1252.73 (72.44) 1306.01 (84.02) 1062.48 (97.87) ** 
Auto Theft 125.43 (10.50) 132.39 (13.23) 100.60 (10.53) ** 
N 617 
 
482 
 
135 
  *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.               
Notes: Estimates are unweighted and clustered at the state level. 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics for state-level covariates by MML implementation status  
 
Full Sample MML=0 MML=1   
  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.   
Proportion Age 45-64 0.24 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00) 0.26 (0.01) *** 
Proportion with College Degree 0.31 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01) 0.33 (0.01) ** 
Proportion Black 0.09 (0.01) 0.11 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) *** 
Proportion Hispanic 0.09 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02) 0.13 (0.04) 0 
Proportion Under Poverty 0.12 (0.00) 0.12 (0.00) 0.12 (0.01) 0 
Beer consumption per capita (in gallons) 22.35 (0.61) 22.12 (0.68) 23.16 (0.96) 0 
Unemployment Rate 5.60 (0.17) 5.29 (0.17) 6.71 (0.37) *** 
Decriminalized Marijuana 0.28 (0.07) 0.18 (0.07) 0.61 (0.13) *** 
Law Enforcement Officers (per 1,000) 2.28 (0.08) 2.31 (0.09) 2.15 (0.12) 0 
N 617 
 
482   135     
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.     
     Notes: Estimates are unweighted and clustered at the state level. 
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Table 2.4 Logged arrest rates for violent crimes as a function of MML policy 
dimensions, by age group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Overall 
Violent 
Crime Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
A) All Ages 
     Dispensaries 0.0510 0.227*** 0.0296 0.181*** 0.0221 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Registries 0.036 -0.130 -0.012 0.014 0.058 
 
(0.06) -(0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
In-home Cultivation 0.030 -0.008 0.098* -0.051 0.033 
 
(0.05) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 617 605 617 616 617 
Mean arrest rate 176.78 4.18 9.22 34.27 129.12 
      B) Adults 
     Dispensaries 0.047 0.232*** -0.020 0.136*** 0.030 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Registries 0.039 -0.106 0.001 0.022 0.066 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
In-home Cultivation 0.036 0.054 0.061 -0.053 0.033 
 
(0.05) (0.18) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 617 607 617 616 617 
Mean arrest rate 196.75 5.01 10.32 33.83 147.63 
      C) Juveniles 
     Dispensaries 0.105*** 0.185 -0.055 0.305*** -0.006 
 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
Registries -0.010 -0.511** -0.017 0.017 0.001 
 
(0.10) (0.21) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) 
In-home Cultivation 0.002 0.013 0.086 -0.081 0.044 
 
(0.08) (0.20) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
Observations 617 525 615 612 617 
Mean arrest rate  257.96 3.80 13.03 79.23 161.90 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.           
Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All arrest rates are logged. The mean arrest rate is per 100,000 
people of the relevant population.  State-level covariates include proportion 45-64 year olds, proportion with a 
college degree, proportion Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer consumption per capita in 
gallons; unemployment rate; and an indicator for whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All models include 
state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. 
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Table 2.5 Logged arrest rates for property crimes as a function of MML policy 
dimensions, by age group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Overall 
Property 
Crime Burglary Theft Auto Theft 
A) All Ages 
    Dispensaries 0.167*** 0.139*** 0.135*** 0.205** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Registries 0.108*** 0.126*** 0.0882** 0.118 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) 
In-home Cultivation -0.043 -0.038 -0.017 -0.247*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate  614.73 96.84 470.58 41.44 
     B) Adults 
    Dispensaries 0.195*** 0.179*** 0.151*** 0.225** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Registries 0.130*** 0.148** 0.110*** 0.084 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.13) 
In-home Cultivation -0.060*** -0.054 -0.048** -0.237*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 563.32 89.02 434.50 36.08 
     C) Juveniles 
    Dispensaries 0.086*** 0.029 0.085** 0.122 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.09) 
Registries -0.014 -0.003 -0.034 0.065 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) 
In-home Cultivation 0.005 0.008 0.059 -0.239*** 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 1666.70 261.64 1252.73 125.43 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.         
Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All arrest rates are logged. The mean arrest rate 
is per 100,000 people of the relevant population.  State-level covariates include proportion 45-64 year 
olds, proportion with a college degree, proportion Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under 
poverty; beer consumption per capita in gallons; unemployment rate; and an indicator for whether state 
decriminalized marijuana.  All models include state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. 
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Table 2.6 Logged arrest rates for violent crimes on restricted and unrestricted dispensary 
policies, by age group  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Overall 
Violent 
Crime Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
A) All Ages 
     Unrestricted Dispensaries  0.054 0.240*** 0.037 0.195*** 0.023 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Restricted Dispensaries  -0.014 -0.095 -0.134 -0.149 0.001 
 
(0.09) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) 
Registries 0.037 -0.125 -0.010 0.019 0.058 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) 
In-home Cultivation 0.030 -0.008 0.097* -0.052 0.032 
 
(0.05) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 617 605 617 616 617 
Mean arrest rate 176.78 4.18 9.22 34.27 129.12 
      B) Adults 
     Unrestricted Dispensaries 0.049 0.239*** -0.005 0.148*** 0.030 
 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Restricted Dispensaries -0.011 0.061 -0.363*** -0.123 0.026 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) 
Registries 0.039 -0.103 0.006 0.026 0.066 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
In-home Cultivation 0.036 0.054 0.060 -0.054 0.033 
 
(0.05) (0.18) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 617 607 617 616 617 
Mean arrest rate 196.75 5.01 10.32 33.83 147.63 
      C) Juveniles 
           Unrestricted Dispensaries 0.114** 0.199* -0.059 0.324*** -0.002 
 
(0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
Restricted Dispensaries -0.106 -0.403 0.031 -0.174 -0.105 
 
(0.10) (0.40) (0.32) (0.21) (0.09) 
Registries -0.007 -0.503** -0.019 0.024 0.003 
 
(0.10) (0.21) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) 
In-home Cultivation 0.001 0.013 0.086 -0.082 0.044 
 
(0.08) (0.20) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) 
Observations 617 525 615 612 617 
Mean arrest rate 257.96 3.80 13.03 79.23 161.90 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All arrest rates are logged. The mean arrest rate is per 100,000 people of 
the relevant population. State-level covariates include proportion 45-64 year olds, proportion with a college degree, 
proportion Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer consumption per capita in gallons; 
unemployment rate; and an indicator for whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All models include state fixed effects 
and state-specific linear time trends. 
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Table 2.7 Logged arrest rates for property crimes on restricted and unrestricted 
dispensary policies, by age group  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Overall 
Property 
Crime Burglary Theft Auto Theft 
A) All Ages 
    Unrestricted Dispensaries  0.173*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.202* 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) 
Restricted Dispensaries 0.033 -0.011 0.014 0.270*** 
 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) 
Registries 0.110*** 0.128*** 0.090** 0.117 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) 
In-home Cultivation -0.043* -0.039 -0.017 -0.247*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 614.73 96.84 470.58 41.44 
B) Adults 
    Unrestricted Dispensaries  0.202*** 0.186*** 0.157*** 0.227** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Restricted Dispensaries 0.029 0.010 -0.004 0.187** 
 
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) 
Registries 0.132*** 0.151** 0.112*** 0.084 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.13) 
In-home Cultivation -0.060*** -0.054 -0.048** -0.237*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 563.32 89.02 434.50 36.08 
C) Juveniles 
    Unrestricted Dispensaries  0.095*** 0.039 0.094*** 0.109 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.10) 
Restricted Dispensaries -0.128* -0.215*** -0.130 0.438** 
 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.20) 
Registries -0.011 0.001 -0.031 0.060 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) 
In-home Cultivation 0.005 0.008 0.058 -0.238*** 
 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 1666.70 261.64 1252.73 125.43 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
    Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All arrest rates are logged. The mean arrest rate is per 100,000 people of 
the relevant population. State-level covariates include proportion 45-64 year olds, proportion with a college degree, 
proportion Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer consumption per capita in gallons; 
unemployment rate; and an indicator for whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All models include state fixed 
effects and state-specific linear time trends. 
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Table 2.8 Logged arrest rates for violent crimes as a function of MMLs, by age group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Overall 
Violent 
Crime Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
Overall 
Property 
Crime Burglary Theft 
Auto 
Theft 
A) All Ages 
         MML 0.016 -0.085 0.073 -0.089*** 0.029 -0.031 -0.018 -0.012 -0.195* 
 
(0.03) (0.15) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) 
Observations 617 605 617 616 617 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 176.78 4.18 9.22 34.27 129.12 614.73 96.84 470.58 41.44 
          B) Adults 
         MML 0.026 -0.025 0.045 -0.073* 0.033 -0.041 -0.027 -0.032 -0.202* 
 
(0.03) (0.14) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) 
Observations 617 607 617 616 617 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate  196.75 5.01 10.32 33.83 147.63 563.32 89.02 434.50 36.08 
          C) Juveniles 
         MML -0.041 -0.180 0.087 -0.151*** 0.022 -0.027 -0.012 0.013 -0.199** 
 
(0.05) (0.16) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
Observations 617 525 615 612 617 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 257.96 3.80 13.03 79.23 161.90 1666.70 261.64 1252.73 125.43 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.           
    Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All 
arrest rates are logged. The mean arrest rate is per 100,000 people of the relevant population. State-level covariates include proportion 45-64 year olds, 
proportion with a college degree, proportion Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer consumption per capita in gallons; unemployment rate; 
and an indicator for whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All models include state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. 
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Table 2.9 Non-logged arrest rates for violent crimes as a function of MMLs, by age 
group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Overall 
Violent 
Crime Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
A) All Ages 
     Dispensaries 14.070* 1.598*** 0.310 9.462*** 2.983 
 
(7.18) (0.53) (0.37) (1.82) (5.53) 
Registries 6.168 -0.341 -0.166 -0.005 5.822 
 
(9.35) (0.63) (0.75) (4.46) (5.64) 
In-home Cultivation 4.338 -0.025 0.520 -4.308 8.160 
 
(8.45) (1.39) (0.62) (3.65) (5.71) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 176.78 4.18 9.22 34.27 129.12 
      B) Adults 
     Dispensaries 11.920 1.769** 0.080 7.212*** 3.644 
 
(8.64) (0.67) (0.42) (1.73) (6.63) 
Registries 5.588 -0.493 0.214 0.720 5.522 
 
(9.13) (0.73) (0.61) (3.36) (6.20) 
In-home Cultivation 5.478 0.569 0.344 -4.462 8.997 
 
(9.14) (1.72) (0.71) (3.31) (6.39) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 196.75 5.01 10.32 33.83 147.63 
      C) Juveniles 
     Dispensaries 39.800*** 1.607** -0.411 36.930*** 0.575 
 
(13.51) (0.66) (0.62) (7.37) (8.43) 
Registries 19.040 -0.351 -0.833 -0.437 20.68** 
 
(23.51) (1.09) (2.58) (17.64) (8.67) 
In-home Cultivation -4.705 -1.771 -0.163 -13.070 10.020 
 
(22.22) (1.09) (1.44) (14.16) (11.21) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 257.96 3.80 13.03 79.23 161.90 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.         
Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All arrest rates are non-logged. The mean arrest rate is per 
100,000 people of the relevant population. Models include state-level covariates: proportion 45-64 year olds, 
proportion with a college degree, proportion Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer 
consumption per capita; unemployment rate; and an indicator for whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All 
models include state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends.  
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Table 2.10 Non-logged arrest rates for property crimes as a function of 
MMLs, by age group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Overall 
Property 
Crime Burglary Theft Auto Theft 
A) All Ages 
    Dispensaries 96.60*** 19.97*** 57.89*** 18.74*** 
 
(13.60) (4.09) (11.82) (5.80) 
Registries 90.93*** 15.53** 64.87** 10.52* 
 
(32.63) (6.77) (31.76) (5.43) 
In-home Cultivation -54.57** -14.31*** -20.480 -19.79*** 
 
(21.03) (4.47) (24.10) (5.11) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 614.73 96.84 470.58 41.44 
     B) Adults 
    Dispensaries 104.9*** 23.39*** 60.32*** 21.21*** 
 
(16.50) (3.45) (13.53) (6.25) 
Registries 89.73*** 16.88** 65.94** 6.909 
 
(27.77) (8.06) (26.54) (6.61) 
In-home Cultivation -53.36*** -15.71** -22.780 -14.87*** 
 
(16.73) (6.99) (16.60) (5.15) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 563.32 89.02 434.50 36.08 
     C) Juveniles 
    Dispensaries 170.3*** 25.170 116.5** 28.65** 
 
(55.39) (18.65) (49.39) (11.71) 
Registries 211.400 26.180 139.000 46.25** 
 
(154.90) (26.08) (136.20) (18.95) 
In-home Cultivation -156.500 -31.10** -44.890 -80.49*** 
 
(114.00) (13.64) (111.80) (13.63) 
Observations 617 617 617 617 
Mean arrest rate 1666.70 261.64 1252.73 125.43 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All arrest rates are non-logged. The mean 
arrest rate is per 100,000 people of the relevant population. Models include state-level covariates: 
proportion 45-64 year olds, proportion with a college degree, proportion Black; proportion 
Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer consumption per capita; unemployment rate; and an 
indicator for whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All models include state fixed effects and 
state-specific linear time trends.  
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Table 2.11 Logged arrest rates for violent crimes as a function of MMLs controlling for law 
enforcement, by age group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Overall 
Violent 
Crime Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
A) All Ages 
     Dispensaries 0.0613* 0.214*** 0.034 0.192*** 0.034 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Registries 0.053 -0.153 -0.007 0.033 0.076 
 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
In-home Cultivation 0.019 0.006 0.095 -0.063 0.021 
 
(0.05) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Law Enforcement  0.132*** -0.181** 0.044 0.148* 0.147*** 
 
(0.04) (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.04) 
Observations 616 604 616 615 616 
Mean arrest rate 176.78 4.18 9.22 34.27 129.12 
      B) Adults 
     Dispensaries 0.056 0.218*** -0.017 0.145*** 0.041 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Registries 0.053 -0.129 0.003 0.036 0.083* 
 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) 
In-home Cultivation 0.027 0.068 0.060 -0.062 0.022 
 
(0.05) (0.18) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Law Enforcement  0.116*** -0.183* 0.0145 0.110* 0.143*** 
 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.06) (0.04) 
Observations 616 606 616 615 616 
Mean arrest rate 196.75 5.01 10.32 33.83 147.63 
      C) Juveniles 
     Dispensaries 0.127*** 0.164 -0.052 0.326*** 0.014 
 
(0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Registries 0.025 -0.548** -0.012 0.053 0.033 
 
(0.08) (0.24) (0.12) (0.14) (0.07) 
In-home Cultivation -0.021 0.032 0.082 -0.103 0.024 
 
(0.06) (0.21) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) 
Law Enforcement 0.284*** -0.245 0.046 0.274* 0.250*** 
 
(0.09) (0.17) (0.24) (0.16) (0.08) 
Observations 616 525 614 611 616 
Mean arrest rate 257.96 3.80 13.03 79.23 161.90 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All arrest rates are logged. Law enforcement is measured as the number 
of sworn police officers per 1,000 persons. The mean arrest rate is per 100,000 people of the relevant population. 
Models include state-level covariates: proportion 45-64 year olds, proportion with a college degree, proportion 
Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer consumption per capita; unemployment rate; and an 
indicator for whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All models include state fixed effects and state-specific linear 
time trends.  
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Table 2.12 Logged arrest rates for property crimes as a function of MMLs controlling for 
law enforcement, by age group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Overall 
Property 
Crime Burglary Theft Auto Theft 
A) All Ages 
    Dispensaries 0.166*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 0.159* 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) 
Registries 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.0981*** 0.043 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.09) 
In-home Cultivation -0.042 -0.036 -0.023 -0.201*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Law Enforcement -0.015 -0.026 0.079 -0.594*** 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.18) 
Observations 616 616 616 616 
Mean arrest rate 614.73 96.84 470.58 41.44 
     B) Adults 
    Dispensaries 0.189*** 0.172*** 0.151*** 0.179** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) 
Registries 0.118*** 0.136** 0.110*** 0.010 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11) 
In-home Cultivation -0.0525** -0.046 -0.0471* -0.191*** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
Law Enforcement -0.093 -0.0961* -0.003 -0.592*** 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.20) 
Observations 616 616 616 616 
Mean arrest rate 563.32 89.02 434.50 36.08 
     C) Juveniles 
    Dispensaries 0.107*** 0.049 0.113*** 0.090 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) 
Registries 0.019 0.029 0.012 0.013 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
In-home Cultivation -0.016 -0.012 0.030 -0.205*** 
 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) 
Law Enforcement 0.259** 0.250** 0.360*** -0.413* 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.21) 
Observations 616 616 616 616 
Mean arrest rate 1666.70 261.64 1252.73 125.43 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
    Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All arrest rates are logged. Law enforcement is measured as the number 
of sworn police officers per 1,000 persons. The mean arrest rate is per 100,000 people of the relevant population. 
Models include state-level covariates: proportion 45-64 year olds, proportion with a college degree, proportion 
Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer consumption per capita; unemployment rate; and an 
indicator for whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All models include state fixed effects and state-specific linear 
time trends.  
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Table 2.13 Logged crime rates for violent and property crimes as a function of MML policy dimensions, all ages (BJS Data) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  
Overall 
Violent 
Crime Murder Rape Robbery Assault 
Overall 
Property 
Crime Burglary Theft 
Auto 
Theft 
Dispensaries 0.026 0.126** -0.018 0.109*** -0.018 0.111*** 0.150*** 0.066*** 0.129* 
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) 
Registries 0.103*** 0.127 0.0544* 0.109** 0.106*** 0.0937* 0.140** 0.078 0.115 
 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13) 
In-home Cultivation -0.0937*** -0.170** 0.007 -0.143*** -0.0795*** -0.048 -0.058 -0.043 -0.091 
 
(0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10) 
          Observations 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 969 
Mean crime rate 454.11 5.77 34.47 125.80 288.07 3583.03 750.13 2472.85 360.06 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
Notes: Coefficients are weighted by average state population during the time period and standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the state level.  All crime 
rates are logged. Mean crime rates are per 100,000 persons.  All models include state-level covariates: proportion 45-64 year olds, proportion with a college 
degree, proportion Black; proportion Hispanic; proportion under poverty; beer consumption per capita in gallons; unemployment rate; and an indicator for 
whether state decriminalized marijuana.  All models include state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends.  Estimated crime rates were obtained from 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: DEFINITIONS OF VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIMES 
 Crime Definition 
Violent Crimes 
Murder (and non-negligent 
manslaughter) 
The wilful (non-negligent) killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence, 
attempts to kill, suicides, accidental deaths, and justifiable homicides are excluded. 
Forcible rape 
The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. Included are rapes by force and 
attempts or assaults to rape. Statutory offenses (no force used - victim under age of consent) are 
excluded. 
Robbery 
The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or 
persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear. 
Aggravated assault 
An unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated 
bodily injury. This type of assault usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by means likely to 
produce death or great bodily harm. Simple assaults are excluded. 
Property Crimes 
Burglary (breaking and 
entering) 
The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or a theft. Attempted forcible entry is included. 
Larceny-theft 
(Except motor vehicle theft) The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from 
the possession or constructive possession of another. Examples are thefts of bicycles or automobile 
accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, or the stealing of any property or article, which is not taken by 
force and violence, or by fraud. Attempted larcenies are included. Embezzlement, "con" games, 
forgery, worthless checks, etc. are excluded. 
Auto theft 
The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle. A motor vehicle is self-propelled and runs on the 
surface and not on rails. Specifically excluded from this category are motorboats, construction 
equipment, airplanes, and farming equipment. 
Notes: Information obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2013/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2013/persons-arrested/persons-arrested) and National Center for Juvenile Justice. (http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezaucr/asp/dictionary.asp). 
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CHAPTER 3: EXAMINING THE JOINT USE OF MARIJUANA AND TOBACCO: THE 
EFFECT OF MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS AND CIGARETTE SMOKING AMONG U.S. 
ADULTS 
 
I. Introduction 
Each year, cigarette smoking generates over $300 billion in health-related costs and is 
responsible for more than 480,000 deaths in the U.S., making it the leading cause of preventable 
death (Bonnie, Stratton, & Wallace, 2007; Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 
2015). While the percent of cigarette smokers has leveled off at just below 20 percent in recent 
years (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013, 2015), the prevalence of past-year 
marijuana use among U.S. adults has more than doubled from 4.1 to 9.5 percent between 2001-
02 to 2012-13 (Hasin, Saha, Kerridge, & et al., 2015). The rise in marijuana use may be 
attributed to softening attitudes towards marijuana use (Jones, 2015); however, it is important to 
ensure that policy changes that result in the increase in marijuana use do not inadvertently 
encourage other harmful health behaviours. 
Cigarette smoking due to increased access to marijuana is of particular concern as many 
recreational marijuana users combine tobacco with marijuana in the form of blunts or spliffs. The 
combined use of marijuana and tobacco contributes to an increased desire to smoke cigarettes 
when marijuana is neither available nor publicly permitted (Agrawal, Budney, & Lynskey, 2012; 
Amos, Wiltshire, Bostock, Haw, & McNeill, 2004; Bélanger, Akre, Kuntsche, Gmel, & Suris, 
2011; Highet, 2004). Studies have also demonstrated the potential for a reverse gateway effect, 
where marijuana use preceded tobacco use for a subset of users (Agrawal, Madden, Bucholz, 
Heath, & Lynskey, 2008; Amos et al., 2004; Bélanger et al., 2011; Highet, 2004; Patton, Coffey,
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Carlin, Sawyer, & Lynskey, 2005; Timberlake et al., 2007). Public health officials therefore need 
to consider the impact of increased access to marijuana on cigarette use. 
Medical marijuana laws (MMLs) are one type of policy that increases access to 
marijuana. While four states (Colorado, Washington, Alaska, and Oregon) have legalized 
recreational marijuana since 2012, sufficient data to study the effects of recreational marijuana 
legalization are not yet available. Consequently, MMLs have been studied to determine the 
impact of increased access to marijuana on a number of downstream health outcomes (Anderson, 
Hansen, & Rees, 2013; Anderson, Rees, & Sabia, 2014; Bachhuber MA, Saloner B, Cunningham 
CO, & Barry CL, 2014; Chu, 2015; Morris, TenEyck, Barnes, & Kovandzic, 2014; Wen, 
Hockenberry, & Cummings, 2015). Indeed, spillovers of medical marijuana into the recreational 
market and an increase in marijuana use among adults following medical marijuana legalization 
has been documented (Bostwick, 2012; Chu, 2014a; Pacula, Powell, Heaton, & Sevigny, 2015; 
Thurstone, Lieberman, & Schmiege, 2011).  
A growing body of literature is examining the impact of MMLs not only on marijuana 
use (Chu, 2014a; Harper, Strumpf, & Kaufman, 2012; Lynne-Landsman, Livingston, & 
Wagenaar, 2013; Pacula et al., 2015) but on other second stage behaviours including traffic 
fatalities, alcohol consumption, and opioid overdose deaths (Anderson et al., 2013, 2014; 
Bachhuber MA et al., 2014; Chu, 2015; Morris et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2015). However, very 
few studies have looked into the relationship between MMLs and cigarette use, particularly 
among U.S. adults. This study first aims to fill this void by estimating the impact of MMLs on 
the probability of cigarette use among U.S. adults. Additionally, this study examines differences 
in smoking probabilities by health status (as defined by four health-related quality of life 
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(HRQOL) measures developed by the Centers for Disease Control). Lastly, this paper examines 
differences in marijuana and cigarette use by gender. 
 
II. Background 
A Brief Background on MMLs 
To date, 23 states and DC have passed MMLs. In general, MMLs provide protection 
from state-level sanctions for individuals who use medical marijuana and for the doctors who 
recommend it (Anderson et al., 2013; National Conference of State Legislatures, 2016). The 
ailments for which medical marijuana use is permitted are listed in state laws, and include 
chronic conditions such as HIV/AIDs, post traumatic stress disorder, cancer, glaucoma, cachexia, 
chronic pain, among other ailments (ProCon, 2015). While the particulars of MMLs vary across 
states, at least one of the following three policy dimensions is typically implemented: required 
patient registries, in-home cultivation allowances, or storefront dispensaries (Table 3.1). States 
with required patient registries mandate that qualified patients seeking to use medical marijuana 
prove medical need (i.e., with a doctor’s recommendation) and register with the state. In return, 
individuals receive a patient ID card allowing them to legally possess and consume medical 
marijuana. States permitting in-home cultivation allow patients or their caregivers to grow a 
certain number of mature and immature plants on their property. Although the intended use of 
the plants is medical, spillovers into recreational use are difficult to monitor and prevent 
(Bostwick, 2012; Pacula et al., 2015; Salomonsen-Sautel, Sakai, Thurstone, Corley, & Hopfer, 
2012; Thurstone et al., 2011; Wirfs-Brock, Seaton, & Sutherland, 2010). States with dispensaries 
permit the operation of storefronts to sell medical marijuana and marijuana products to qualified 
patients.  
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Theorized Links between MMLs and Cigarette Use 
Previous studies have found that, on average, MMLs increase marijuana use among 
adults (Chu, 2014a; Pacula et al., 2015; Wen et al., 2015). In particular, certain MML policy 
dimensions, namely dispensaries and in-home cultivation allowances, have been found to 
increase marijuana use (Pacula et al., 2015). Registries, on the other hand, were not found to 
change marijuana use, though some studies identified a negative but statistically insignificant 
impact (Pacula et al., 2015; Wen et al., 2015). The varied impact of each policy dimension 
underscores the differential impact MMLs have on marijuana use depending on the policy 
dimensions that have been included in state law.  
Past studies have also found that marijuana and cigarettes are economic complements 
where a decrease in the (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) price of one substance leads to an increase 
in demand for the other (Cameron & Williams, 2001; Chaloupka, Pacula, Farrelly, Johnston, & 
O’Malley, 1999; Farrelly, Bray, Zarkin, & Wendling, 2001). Indeed, MMLs have been found to 
decrease the price of high quality marijuana, suggesting an increase in the supply of marijuana 
(Anderson et al., 2013). Accordingly, the MML policy dimensions that increase access to and 
consumption of marijuana are expected to result in an increase in cigarette use as well. 
Specifically, in-home cultivation can be expected to increase the probability of cigarette use, 
while registries may have minimal or potentially a negative effect on cigarette use. 
The effect of dispensaries on cigarette smoking, however, is less clear. Although states 
with dispensaries experience an increase in marijuana use, two points should be considered. 
First, dispensaries increase access to non-smoked marijuana products such as edibles, tinctures, 
oil, and lotions (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2014; O’Connell & Bou-Matar, 2007; Simon, 
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2010; Vandrey R et al., 2015; Wang G, Roosevelt G, & Heard K, 2013; Wardarski, 2015). 
Second, the complementary relationship between marijuana and cigarettes may only hold when 
both substances are smoked.  Smoked marijuana and cigarettes share a common route of 
administration that may serve as a link contributing to sustained tobacco use among cannabis 
smokers (Agrawal et al., 2012; Agrawal & Lynskey, 2009). In contrast, smokeless tobacco use is 
not associated with marijuana use, likely due to differing routes of administration (Agrawal & 
Lynskey, 2009). The corollary may also be true in that edible marijuana may not be used with 
smoked tobacco because they lack a common route of administration. Thus, the effect of 
dispensaries on cigarette smoking could be positive or negative. On the one hand, dispensaries 
may lead to an increase in cigarette smoking if it increases access to smoked forms of marijuana. 
Alternatively, dispensaries may discourage smoking if it encourages the consumption of non-
smoked forms of marijuana. 
Given that the target population of MMLs is individuals experiencing chronic physical 
and mental health conditions, it is important to understand how MMLs differentially impact 
individuals with different health statuses. This analysis provides insights on the implementation 
of MMLs (i.e., impacts on the target population; unintended impacts on the non-targeted 
population). MMLs should result in no increase in cigarette smoking among unhealthy (i.e., 
targeted) individuals (Hoffmann & Weber, 2010; National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2016), since cannabis products are presumably being used as medicine and because medical 
users are more likely to prefer non-smoked forms of marijuana (Pacula, Jacobson, & 
Maksabedian, 2016). Further, although MMLs target a chronically ill population, and healthy 
individuals have no legitimate claim to medical marijuana use, considerable evidence exists of 
spillovers from medical marijuana markets to recreational markets (Chu, 2014b; Pacula et al., 
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2016; Thurstone et al., 2011; Wirfs-Brock et al., 2010). Given these spillovers, and to the extent 
that healthy individuals represent a potential pool of recreational marijuana users, MML policy 
dimensions that increase access to marijuana (particularly in-home cultivation) may lead to an 
increase in cigarette smoking among healthy individuals. 
Lastly, concerning differences by gender, men are more likely to smoke both marijuana 
and cigarettes than women (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2001). For instance, among adults, 19 percent of males smoke 
while only 15 percent of females smoke cigarettes.  Likewise, 9.7 percent of males are current 
users of marijuana, while only 5.6 percent of women report current marijuana use (Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2014). Consequently, males are expected to 
experience an increase in smoking in states with MML policy dimensions that increase access to 
marijuana (i.e., in states with in-home cultivation and possibly dispensaries).  
 
III. Data and Empirical Specification 
Data 
 Data on individual smoking behaviour are drawn from the 1993-2010 Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) surveys administered by the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC).  Telephone-based surveys are administered annually in each state using a 
randomly selected cross-sectional sample of individuals age 18 and over. Surveys collect 
information on demographic characteristics, health status, and health behaviours. This study 
combined the annual surveys into a pooled cross-sectional dataset consisting of 2,722,046 
observations of adults aged 18-64 with sampling weights and full information on key covariates 
across the 18 years. The sample was restricted to adults aged 18-64 since the smoking rate and 
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illicit drug use declines considerably among individuals 65 and older (Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2015; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, 2013). 
 
Measures 
 Current smoking. In accordance with the CDC, current smokers were defined as 
individuals who reported smoking at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime and smoking on at least 
one day in the past 30 days (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). Those who reported smoking less than 100 lifetime 
cigarettes or no smoking in the past 30 days were categorized as current non-smokers. 
 Medical Marijuana Laws.  States enacted various combinations of MML policy 
dimensions, and often policy dimensions were enacted at different times within each state. 
Rather than using a binary indicator to capture MML enactment, which masks potentially 
heterogeneous impacts on cigarette use (Pacula et al., 2015), MMLs were coded as a set of three 
binary variables (0/1 variable) indicating whether a state had a required patient registry, a legally 
operating dispensary, or in-home cultivation. The registry variable captured states where 
qualified medical marijuana patients were required to register; this measure excluded states that 
implemented voluntary registries.  The dispensary variable included states that have legally 
protected dispensaries in operation.  Moreover, the dispensary indicator reflected the date on 
which dispensaries opened, rather than the date legislation was passed. As a result, the analysis 
isolated the effect of an increase in supply of marijuana, rather than any anticipatory effects 
associated with a law change (Anderson & Rees, 2014). Lastly, the in-home cultivation variable 
included those states that permitted patients to grow plants at home. 
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 Health status. Health status was defined according to the CDC’s Health-Related Quality 
of Life (HRQOL) variables, which include measures of self-rated health, physical functioning, 
psychological well-being, and disability or lost productivity (Hennessy 1994; Mody and Smith, 
2006).  Four questions are asked in the BRFSS that obtain information on each dimension of 
HRQOL: (1) (self-rated health) “Would you say that in general your health is poor, fair, good, 
very good, or excellent?” (2) (physically unhealthy days) “Now thinking about your physical 
health, which includes physical illness and injury, for how many days during the past 30 days 
was your physical health not good?” (3) (mentally unhealthy days) “Now thinking about your 
mental health, which includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions, for how many 
days during the past 30 days was your mental health not good?” (4) (activity limitation 
days/disability) “During the past 30 days, for about how many days did poor physical or mental 
health keep you from doing your usual activities, such as self-care, work, or recreation?” These 
four measures have good construct validity and reliability, which has been documented 
elsewhere (Idler & Benyamini, 1997; Kapp, Jackson-Thompson, Petroski, & Schootman, 2009; 
Newschaffer, 1998).  
 In accordance with CDC recommendations (Brown et al., 2003, 2004; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2015b; Ford, Moriarty, Zack, Mokdad, & Chapman, 2001; 
Mody & Smith, 2006), the self-rated health variable was measured as a dichotomous variable 
(excellent, very good, and good versus fair and poor). The remaining three healthy days variables 
were dichotomized as less than 14 days (relatively healthy) and greater than or equal to 14 days 
(relatively unhealthy). Individuals who reported zero physically and mentally unhealthy days 
were coded as having no activity limitation days. Four separate measures of health were used 
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since state MMLs cover a range of chronic conditions that cover both physical and mental health. 
Accordingly, these measures of health capture multiple dimensions of health.  
 Individual demographic controls. Analyses controlled for the respondent’s age, race and 
ethnicity (coded categorically as non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, or Other), 
and gender.  The respondent’s marital status (married/in a relationship or single) and educational 
attainment (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, or college graduate) were 
also included as covariates.  
 State-level characteristics.  Models included a dichotomous variable for whether the state 
decriminalized marijuana (1=yes, 0=no) (Marijuana Policy Project, 2015; Scott, 2010) as well as 
the sum of the state and federal beer tax adjusted to 2010 dollars (Beer Institute, 2013). The state 
unemployment rate and income per capita (adjusted to 2010 dollars) were obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), respectively.  To 
capture state attitudes towards smoking, analysis controlled for state cigarette excise taxes, which 
were obtained from the Tax Burden on Tobacco (adjusted to 2010 dollars) (Orzechowski & 
Walker, 2015), and a binary measure of whether states had implemented a smoking ban in bars 
(American Lung Association, 2015; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015a). The 
model also included state-fixed effects to control for time-invariant state-level heterogeneity, 
while year-fixed effects were included to control for secular time trends common across all 
states.  A state-specific linear time trend variable controlled for differing trends in smoking 
across states over time.   
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Analytic Approach 
 The bivariate relationship that illustrates the unadjusted proportion of current smokers for 
the full sample by MML implementation status was first estimated. To control for potential 
confounders, the following multivariate state-fixed effects model was estimated using ordinary 
least squares (OLS):  
                                                                           
where Smokeist is the binary smoking status for individual i in state s at year t.  Dispst, InHomest, 
and Registryst are the various state-level MML policy dimension indicators. Xist and Zst represent 
a vector of individual- and state-level covariates, respectively. State-fixed effects are denoted by 
  , and state-specific linear time trends are indicated by         , which control for changes in 
smoking in each state due to time. The fixed effects approach exploits within-state changes, thus 
controlling for unobserved time-invariant state-level confounders (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). To 
account for the sampling procedures of the BRFSS, all estimates are weighted and standard 
errors are clustered at the state level (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). Since the outcome 
of interest is dichotomous, the model was estimated as a linear probability model, which 
provides a more intuitive percentage point interpretation of the estimated coefficients than a 
logistic regression model.  In sensitivity analyses (not shown), results from the logistic 
regression did not qualitatively differ from OLS estimates. 
 The multivariate fixed effects model was first estimated for the full sample, which 
provided the independent effect of MML policy dimensions on the probability of current 
smoking.  Next, the sample was stratified by health status to compare the results between 
relatively healthy and unhealthy individuals with respect to overall self-reported health, physical 
health, mental health, and activity limitations. The coefficients for healthy and unhealthy 
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individuals were compared for each HRQOL measure by estimating a single model and 
interacting health status with each covariate (not shown) and testing the significance of these 
interactions.  
Since the specific illnesses constituting poor health were not reported in the BRFSS 
surveys, and because the HRQOL measure of healthy individuals includes people who 
experienced 1 to 13 unhealthy days, it is possible some of the “healthy” respondents may be part 
of the MML targeted population. As a test of sensitivity, the HRQOL models were re-estimated 
using only individuals who reported zero unhealthy days and 30 unhealthy days. Those 
respondents who indicated 30 unhealthy days (in the past 30 days) more likely represent those 
with a significant chronic illness for which medical marijuana may be useful.  Individuals who 
reported 0 unhealthy days likely represented healthy individuals without chronic illness and who 
were not the target audience for MMLs.  
To determine differences by gender, the models were run separately for males and 
females and a fully interacted model was estimated to test for significant differences between 
males and females. Lastly, the behaviours of males and females were again compared by health 
status, which was done by stratifying the sample by health status and gender. All estimates were 
weighted and standard errors were clustered at the state level (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 
2004). 
  
IV. Results 
Among all adults in the sample, 23 percent reported being current smokers. In the state-
years with MMLs, 18 percent were current smokers whereas 24 percent of respondents were 
current smokers in state-years without MMLs (Table 3.2). This lower smoking prevalence 
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associated with MMLs did not account for omitted factors that affect the probability of smoking 
and ignored heterogeneity across state MML policies that may differentially impact smoking 
rates. 
 Turning to the multivariate analysis of all adults, dispensaries and required patient 
registries had a protective effect on smoking while in-home cultivation encouraged smoking 
(Table 3.3, Panel A). Relative to states without dispensaries and registries, adults in states with 
dispensaries and registries were 1.4 and 2.0 percentage points less likely to be current smokers, 
respectively. At the weighted sample mean, this represented a decline in the probability of 
smoking by 6.1 (-0.014/0.231=-0.061) and 8.7 (-0.020/0.231=-0.087) percent respectively. In 
contrast, states with in-home cultivation experienced a significant increase in the probability of 
smoking by 1.1 percentage points (or 4.8 percent), partially offsetting the protective effect of 
dispensaries and registries on cigarette smoking.  
Looking at differences by health status, dispensaries and registries were also consistently 
protective for both healthy and unhealthy individuals across all health status measures (Table 
3.3, Panel B). In contrast, the increase in smoking probability due to in-home cultivation was 
largely driven by the healthy population. For all four measures of poor health status, in-home 
cultivation did not significantly impact the probability of smoking. Conversely, in-home 
cultivation led to a significant increase in the probability of smoking ranging from 1.2 to 1.4 
percentage points among relatively healthy individuals. Tests of equality showed that the 
difference between those with good mental health versus those with poor mental health was 
statistically significant.  
In the sensitivity analysis (not shown), which only included those who reported 0 or 30 
unhealthy days, the coefficients on in-home cultivation and registries were consistent with the 
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main results. Dispensaries were also largely consistent with main results, with the exception of 
an increase in the probability of smoking among physically unhealthy adults. The reversal in 
signs among the physically ill suggests the dispensary estimates should be considered with 
caution, particularly as only three states passed MMLs with dispensaries within the study 
timeframe (i.e., California, Colorado, and New Mexico).   
 Turning to differences by gender (Table 3.3, Panel C), states with dispensaries and 
registries experienced significant declines in smoking probabilities among both men and women, 
while in-home cultivation led to significant increases in the probability of smoking. Consistent 
with the hypothesis that men would be more responsive to increased access to marijuana, the 
increase in smoking probabilities due to home cultivation for men was larger than that for 
women (1.8 and 0.4 percentage points respectively), though the difference was not statistically 
significant.  
 Although it was expected that unhealthy individuals would be more likely to use 
marijuana medicinally and therefore be less likely to smoke cigarettes upon passage of MMLs, 
the estimates from the models stratified by health status and gender revealed otherwise (Table 
3.4). Among physically unhealthy and limited activity males (Table 3.4, Panel A), dispensaries 
led to an increase in the probability of smoking by 2.2 and 4.8 percentage points, respectively. In 
contrast, dispensaries led to a decline in the probability of smoking among unhealthy females, 
consistent with the estimates for all measures of unhealthy individuals. These results suggest that 
dispensaries largely encouraged males to smoke, regardless of health status. 
 Another striking difference emerged in states that permitted in-home cultivation. 
Specifically, unhealthy males with poor self-rated health, poor physical health, and limited 
activity experienced an increase in the probability of smoking as a result of in-home cultivation. 
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These males also were significantly more likely to smoke than their female counterparts (who 
experienced declines in the probability of smoking). Thus, the coefficients on in-home 
cultivation for unhealthy males and females largely offset each other, which resulted in the null 
findings in the main health status models (Table 3.3, Panel B). Moreover, the positive 
coefficients on unhealthy and healthy males suggests that in-home cultivation encouraged 
cigarette smoking among all males, regardless of health status. 
 Registries were associated with declines in smoking probabilities among healthy and 
unhealthy men and women, which was consistent with the findings in the overall health status 
estimates. The results for healthy males and females across all measures of HRQOL were 
consistent with the results for healthy adults overall (Table 3.4, Panel B). 
 
V. Discussion 
 As more states debate the merits of medical and recreational marijuana policies, it is 
important to understand the potential unintended consequences such laws might have on other 
health behaviours. This study highlighted the differential impact specific MML policy 
dimensions had on cigarette use. On average, dispensaries and registries decreased the 
probability of cigarette smoking.  
The magnitude of the decline in smoking probabilities associated with registries and 
dispensaries was comparable to the implementation of smoke-free policies, such as workplace 
bans or public smoking bans, which reduce tobacco use by 3.4 percentage points (Hopkins et al., 
2010). Although MML policy dimensions were not enacted with the intention of impacting 
cigarette smoking, the reduction in smoking probabilities was an added public health benefit.  
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The negative coefficient on dispensaries among adults supports the hypothesis that 
dispensaries increase access to non-smoked forms of marijuana products, which may not 
encourage cigarette use due to differing routes of administration. Although dispensaries on 
average protected against cigarette smoking, it is concerning that dispensaries were associated 
with an increase in the probability of smoking among unhealthy males. Further research is 
needed to understand the factors contributing to the increase in smoking among this population.  
Policymakers, however, should be wary of the increase in the probability of smoking 
among relatively healthy adults due to in-home cultivation. Given that healthy adults have few 
health-related reasons to cultivate medical marijuana, this increase may be indicative of 
recreational use. In-home cultivation is difficult for law enforcement to monitor to ensure 
individuals abide by cultivation rules and plant limits.  Consequently, spillovers of medical 
marijuana for recreational use are difficult to prevent.   
 
Study Strengths and Limitations 
 This study contributes to the limited empirical literature exploring the relationship 
between marijuana and cigarettes.  In addition to estimating the effects of individual MML 
policy dimensions, this research used a policy change that altered the availability of marijuana as 
a way to better understand the interrelationship between marijuana and cigarette use. This study 
also employed an identification strategy that controlled for unobserved state-level time-invariant 
covariates.  Furthermore, the study covered a relatively long time period with a nationally 
representative sample that included the early MML adopters. 
A few limitations of this study should be noted.  First, due to data limitations, this study 
only considered the extensive margin of cigarette use.  This measure did not capture the intensity 
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of use, such as the number of cigarettes smoked by existing and new smokers. Second, only three 
jurisdictions had legally operating dispensaries within the study time period (i.e., California, 
Colorado, and New Mexico), limiting the amount of variation that could be used to identify 
causal effects; the dispensary results should therefore be interpreted with caution. Third, this 
study was unable to identify the exact mechanisms linking MMLs and cigarette use. Marijuana 
consumption is one potential mechanism through which MMLs affect cigarette use. However, 
marijuana use was not directly observed in BRFSS, limiting the ability to determine conclusively 
that MMLs affected cigarette use through changes in marijuana use. Moreover, given that 
dispensaries and in-home cultivation led to an increase in smoking probabilities among 
unhealthy males, there may be other unexplored factors linking medical marijuana availability 
and cigarette smoking that warrant further study. 
  
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Although smoking rates have declined in the past 20 years (Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2013, 2015), policymakers need to be sure MMLs do not inadvertently 
counteract the downward trend in smoking. In particular, policymakers seeking to discourage 
cigarette use should be weary of in-home cultivation allowances without a system in place to 
monitor and enforce cultivation limits. Required patient registries were associated with declines 
in smoking, indicating the added benefit of tracking medical marijuana users.  
The decline in cigarette smoking probabilities associated with dispensaries is suggestive 
of potential public health benefits. However, the exact mechanism linking dispensaries and 
cigarette smoking is not yet clear. Moreover, the public health benefits should be balanced 
against the potential risks related to the consumption (or over-consumption) of edible products, 
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spillovers to children, or the inability to identify the concentration of tetrahydrocannabinol 
(THC, the active ingredient in marijuana) in edible products purchased at dispensaries (Vandrey 
et al., 2015; Wardarski, 2015). The potential impact of dispensaries on other societal 
consequences, such as crime (Alford, 2014; Morris et al., 2014), should also be considered.  
Thus, before endorsing dispensaries as a means to reduce cigarette smoking, the public health 
benefits should be weighed against potential risks, and measures to mitigate these risks also need 
to be put in place.  
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Table 3.1 States that enacted medical marijuana laws from 1993-
2010 
State 
MML law 
in effect 
Legal 
dispensary 
opened 
In home 
cultivation 
allowed 
Required 
registry 
opened 
Alaska 1999 
 
1999 1999 
California 1996 2004 1996 
 Colorado 2001 2004 2001 2001 
DC 2010 
  
2010 
Hawaii 2000 
 
2000 2000 
Maine 1999 
 
1999 2009 
Michigan 2008 
 
2008 
 Montana 2004 
 
2004 
 Nevada 2001 
 
2001 2001 
New Jersey 2010 
  
2010 
New Mexico 2007 2009 2007 2007 
Oregon 1998 
 
1998 2007 
Rhode Island 2006 
 
2006 2007 
Vermont 2004 
 
2004 2004 
Washington 1998   1998   
Notes: In Colorado, the first reported dispensary opened in 2004; however a majority 
of the dispensaries did not open until 2009/10.(Anderson & Rees, 2014; Weinstein, 
2010) 
  
  
8
7
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics of variables, by MML status   
 
Full Sample MML not in effect MML in effect 
  Mean/% (s.d.) Mean/% (s.d.) Mean/% (s.d.)   
Primary Outcome 
       Smoker (%) 0.23 (0.01) 0.24 (0.00) 0.18 (0.01) *** 
Individual-level Characteristics 
       Age (mean) 39.65 (0.13) 39.66 (0.12) 39.60 (0.29)  
White (%) 0.70 (0.04) 0.73 (0.02) 0.57 (0.08) ** 
Black (%) 0.10 (0.01) 0.11 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) *** 
Other (%) 0.06 (0.01) 0.05 (0.00) 0.11 (0.01) *** 
Hispanic (%) 0.14 (0.03) 0.11 (0.02) 0.28 (0.07) ** 
Female (%) 0.50 (0.00) 0.50 (0.00) 0.49 (0.00) *** 
Married/In a relationship (%) 0.65 (0.01) 0.65 (0.01) 0.64 (0.01)   
Less than HS (%) 0.11 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01) 0.15 (0.03) * 
HS Graduate (%) 0.29 (0.01) 0.30 (0.01) 0.24 (0.01) *** 
Some College (%) 0.28 (0.00) 0.28 (0.00) 0.28 (0.01)   
College Graduate (%) 0.32 (0.01) 0.32 (0.01) 0.33 (0.01)   
State-level Characteristics 
       Marijuana decriminalized (%) 0.34 (0.12) 0.25 (0.09) 0.81 (0.15) *** 
Unemployment Rate (mean) 5.93 (0.19) 5.73 (0.12) 6.93 (0.22) *** 
Income per capita (mean)  37,414.76   (804.46)   36,817.18   (892.78)   40,374.80   (624.97)  *** 
Beer tax, cents (mean) 0.96 (0.03) 0.97 (0.03) 0.90 (0.02) * 
Cigarette state excise tax, cents (mean) 84.86 (8.11) 79.25 (9.47) 112.66 (15.22) * 
Bar smoking ban (%) 0.24 (0.08) 0.14 (0.04) 0.75 (0.12) *** 
Health Status 
       Self-rated Healthy (%) 0.88 (0.00) 0.88 (0.00) 0.86 (0.01) * 
≥14 Physically Unhealthy Days (%) 0.09 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.09 (0.00) *** 
≥14 Mentally Unhealthy Days (%) 0.10 (0.00) 0.10 (0.00) 0.11 (0.00) ** 
≥14 Limited Activity Days (%) 0.06 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 0.06 (0.00) *** 
        N 2,722,046 2,222,559 499,487 
 Percentage of Full Sample     82%   18%    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       Notes: All estimates are weighted and adjusted for clustering at the state level.  All N's are unweighted. 
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Table 3.3 LPM estimates of the impact of MML policy dimensions on the probability of current 
smoking for adults under age 65, 1993-2010 
  MML Dimensions    
 
Dispensary 
In Home 
Cultivation 
Patient 
Registry 
Prop. 
Smoker N 
A) All Adults 
  
  
     Adults -0.014 *** 0.011 ** -0.020 *** 0.231 2,722,046 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
   
         B) Health Status 
        Self-Rated Unhealthy -0.012*** -0.004
 
-0.022 * 0.335 369,438 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.010)
 
(0.013) 
   Self-Rated Healthy -0.015*** 0.014** -0.019 *** 0.216 2,352,608 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.007) 
   
       ≥14 Unhealthy Days, 
Physical Health 
-0.010*** 0.005
 
-0.011
 
0.336 279,279 
(0.004) 
 
(0.008)
 
(0.009) 
   <14 Unhealthy Days, 
Physical Health 
-0.014*** 0.012** -0.021 *** 0.221 2,442,767 
(0.004) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
   
       ≥14 Unhealthy Days, 
Mental Health 
-0.037*** -0.009
 
-0.028 ** 0.388 305,242 
(0.003) 
 
(0.008)
 
(0.014) 
   <14 Unhealthy Days, 
Mental Health 
-0.011*** 0.013** -0.018 *** 0.212 2,416,804 
(0.003) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
   
       ≥14 Limited Activity Days -0.014*** 0.010
 
-0.028 *** 0.378 186,274 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.007)
 
(0.010) 
   <14 Limited Activity Days -0.014*** 0.012*** -0.020 *** 0.222 2,535,772 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.006) 
   
         C) Gender 
        Males -0.014*** 0.018** -0.026 *** 0.251 1,094,643 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
   Females -0.015*** 0.004* -0.014 ** 0.210 1,627,403 
  (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.006)       
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
Notes: Covariates include individual age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, student status, retirement status, educational 
attainment, and state-level variables for marijuana decriminalization, unemployment rate, per capita income, state and federal 
beer tax, state cigarette tax, and smoking bans in bars. All regressions include state fixed effects and state-specific linear time 
trends. Regressions are weighted using BRFSS "_finalwt." Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level.  
Sample includes adults aged 18-64. Bolded values indicate significant differences in smoking probabilities (at p<0.1) between the 
healthy and unhealthy statuses. No significant differences in smoking probabilities exist between males and females. Unhealthy 
is defined as ≥14 unhealthy or limited activity days. Healthy is defined as <14 unhealthy or limited activity days. 
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Table 3.4 Gender differences among healthy and unhealthy individuals, LPM estimates of the 
impact of MML policy dimensions on the probability of current smoking 
  MML Dimensions     
 
Dispensary 
In Home 
Cultivation 
Patient 
Registry 
Prop. 
Smoker N 
A) Unhealthy Individuals 
        Self-Rated Unhealthy Males -0.007 
 
0.033 *** -0.054 *** 0.372 139,726 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.015) 
   Self-Rated Unhealthy Females -0.027 *** -0.039 ** 0.007 
 
0.301 229,712 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.021) 
   Physically Unhealthy, Males 0.022 
 
0.047 *** -0.041 ** 0.363 97,215 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.018) 
   Physically Unhealthy, Females -0.036 *** -0.031 
 
0.015 
 
0.316 182,064 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.015) 
   Mentally Unhealthy, Males -0.019 ** 0.002 
 
-0.045 *** 0.419 93,765 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.016) 
   Mentally Unhealthy, Females -0.049 *** -0.015 
 
-0.015 
 
0.367 211,477 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.018) 
   Limited Activity, Males 0.048 *** 0.053 ** -0.053 ** 0.399 65,736 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.021) 
   Limited Activity, Females -0.061 *** -0.027 ** -0.008 
 
0.362 120,538 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.018) 
   B) Healthy Individuals 
     Self Rated Healthy Males -0.018 *** 0.016 * -0.021 ** 0.235 954,917 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
   Self-Rated Healthy Females -0.012 *** 0.011 *** -0.017 ** 0.197 1,397,691 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.007) 
   Physically Healthy, Males -0.017 *** 0.016 * -0.024 *** 0.242 997,428 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
   Physically Healthy, Females -0.012 *** 0.008 *** -0.017 *** 0.199 1,445,339 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.006) 
   Mentally Healthy, Males -0.014 *** 0.019 * -0.023 ** 0.235 1,000,878 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.009) 
   Mentally Healthy, Females -0.009 ** 0.006 *** -0.012 * 0.188 1,415,926 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.006) 
   Limited Activity, Males -0.018 *** 0.017 ** -0.025 *** 0.243 1,028,907 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
   Limited Activity, Females -0.011 *** 0.007 *** -0.015 ** 0.200 1,506,865 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.006) 
   *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. 
Notes: Covariates include individual age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, student status, retirement status, educational 
attainment, and state-level variables for marijuana decriminalization, unemployment rate, per capita income, state and federal 
beer tax, state cigarette tax, and smoking bans in bars. All regressions include state fixed effects and state-specific linear time 
trends. Regressions are weighted using BRFSS "_finalwt." Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level.  
Sample includes adults aged 18-64. Bolded values indicate significant differences in smoking probabilities (at p<0.1) between 
males and females within each health status. Unhealthy is defined as ≥14 unhealthy or limited activity days. Healthy is defined as 
<14 unhealthy or limited activity days. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY: THE CASE OF SUPERVISED 
INJECTION SERVICES IN ONTARIO 
 
I. Introduction 
 
An evidence-based approach to policymaking, particularly in public health policy, 
follows a linear and predictable path: a public problem is identified; reliable data are collected 
and research is conducted; and an optimal solution based on evidence is proposed, adopted, and 
implemented. Such a model implies that the availability of evidence and research is a sufficient 
condition for the adoption of appropriate policy interventions (Bernier & Clavier, 2011; Fafard, 
2012). Supervised injection facilities are one intervention that has considerable peer-reviewed 
evidence of public health benefits (Rapid Response Service, 2014). 
 Supervised injection services (SISs) are legally sanctioned clinics or facilities where 
injection drug users can consume pre-obtained illicit drugs in a medically supervised 
environment.  Such sites are intended to reduce health and public order problems associated with 
illicit drug use and also connect drug users to resources and referrals to treatment, housing, and 
other social supports (Dolan, Kimber, Fry, Fitzgerald, & al, 2000; Rapid Response Service, 
2014). Over 90 supervised injection sites exist worldwide, primarily in Europe (Drug Policy 
Alliance, 2016). Yet North America has only two supervised injection sites, both in Vancouver, 
British Columbia (CBC News, 2016). Even in Canada, despite empirical evidence citing 
benefits, and support from front-line workers and scientists, a supervised injection service has 
yet to open in other parts of the country. To understand the barriers to establishing SISs in North  
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America, this study looks at Ontario to identify the factors that have prevented the adoption of 
SISs in this province. 
 
History of Supervised Injection Facilities in Canada 
 In 2003, Insite opened in Vancouver as North America’s first supervised injection site. In 
2012 (the most recent data available), over 9,200 unique individuals visited the site and there 
were 497 overdose incidents but no overdose deaths have occurred (Schatz & Nougier, 2012; 
Vancouver Coastal Health, n.d.). Numerous peer-reviewed studies have found that Insite reduced 
overdose mortality rates (Marshall, Milloy, Wood, Montaner, & Kerr, 2011); reduced needle 
sharing (Kerr, Tyndall, Li, Montaner, & Wood, 2005) and publicly discarded needles (Wood, 
Tyndall, Montaner, & Kerr, 2006); increased entry into detoxification programs (DeBeck et al., 
2011; Wood, Tyndall, Zhang, Montaner, & Kerr, 2007); did not increase the rate of drug use 
(Kerr, 2006; Wood et al., 2006); and was cost effective, with conservative estimates suggesting 
savings of $14 million over 10 years (Bayoumi & Zaric, 2008). 
To operate legally in Canada, Insite required the federal government to grant an 
exemption from the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). Despite evidence of the 
public health benefits, the federal government at the time (led by Stephen Harper’s Conservative 
Party) refused to extend the exemption past 2008 due to concerns that Insite did not effectively 
reduce drug use and addiction (goals outside of Insite’s purview). Moreover, the Conservative 
Party had made it a priority not to use public money to “fund drug use” (Dooling & Rachlis, 
2010). The party was vocal in its view that illicit drug use was unacceptable (Woods, 2005) and 
was concerned that government-funded SISs would send mixed messages to young people about 
drug use (Galloway, 2008). The refusal to extend the exemption led to a lengthy court challenge 
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between Insite and the federal government that eventually reached the Supreme Court of Canada 
(SCC).  
In a unanimous decision delivered in September 2011, the SCC ordered the federal 
government to grant Insite an exemption from the CDSA. The basis for the ruling was that Insite 
offered life-saving services for injection drug users and denying these services constituted a 
violation of the right to life and security of the person of potential clients (Canada (Attorney 
General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 2011). The Supreme Court’s decision laid the 
groundwork for future supervised injection services to open across Canada. The decision was 
celebrated by Ontario’s harm reduction proponents who had been working to establish the 
province’s first supervised injection facility.  
 Following the decision, researchers from the University of Toronto published a feasibility 
study exploring whether the cities of Toronto and Ottawa would benefit from supervised 
consumption sites. The Toronto and Ottawa Supervised Consumption Assessment (TOSCA) 
study noted that Toronto had the highest number of drug users in Ontario and that Ottawa had 
the highest new rate of HIV infections among injection drug users in Ontario (Bayoumi et al., 
2012). The TOSCA study recommended three supervised injection sites for Toronto and two 
sites for Ottawa, and that these sites be integrated into existing organizations that serve drug 
users (Bayoumi et al., 2012). The TOSCA authors concluded that benefits would arise from 
averting hepatitis C infections and cost savings associated with preventing disease contraction 
(Bayoumi et al., 2012; Enns et al., 2015).  
 This case study explores why Ontario has not yet opened a SIS, despite legal precedence, 
a demonstrated need, and considerable empirical evidence indicating several public health and 
fiscal benefits. In doing so, we build upon literature exploring the role of politics in public health 
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policymaking (Gollust, Baum, & Jacobson, 2008; Oliver, 2006) and apply it to the case of 
supervised injection sites and injection drug use issues more broadly, a highly stigmatized public 
health issue (Des Jarlais, 2000; MacCoun, 2012; Moss, 2000; Olsen & Sharfstein, 2014). By 
exploring the case of SISs in Ontario, this study considers the clash between science and politics 
and why empirical evidence does not always result in corresponding policy changes. This study 
also discusses the limits and possibilities in adopting harm reduction policies especially as they 
pertain to illicit drug use. While past studies have assessed the prospects of establishing SISs in 
other parts of North America (Beletsky, Davis, Anderson, & Burris, 2008; Hyshka, Bubela, & 
Wild, 2013), the Ontario experience represents an opportunity to explore the actual decision 
making process surrounding SISs. As advocates across Canada (i.e., Victoria, Montréal) and the 
U.S. (i.e., New York City, Ithaca, Boston, Seattle) call for supervised injection facilities 
(Anderson, 2016; Bebinger, 2016; CBC News, 2015; Chen, 2016; Drug Policy Alliance, 2015; 
Valiante, 2015), the lessons learned from Ontario highlight the challenges that arise when 
navigating controversial public health recommendations through the policymaking process. 
 
II. Methods 
 Data for this case study were obtained from semi-structured key informant interviews and 
document reviews. Key informants were identified through an initial web search of actors 
involved in drug policy development in Toronto and Ottawa. A snowball approach was used to 
recruit additional key stakeholders, resulting in a total of 11 participants. Key informants 
represented municipal and provincial levels of government as well as various policy spheres (i.e., 
policymakers, agency/program delivery, researchers, grassroots advocates) (Table 4.1).  
  94 
 Interview participants were asked a series of open-ended questions about key events that 
influenced SIS development in Ontario, public opinion surrounding SISs, responses by the 
provincial and federal governments, and critical barriers and facilitators to establishing SISs in 
Ontario. Interviews were conducted between August 2015 and February 2016 by the first author, 
recorded, and transcribed verbatim. Each interview lasted approximately 30-45 minutes. The 
questions primarily focused on events occurring between 2003 to January 2016 to capture 
changes that resulted from the October 2015 federal election, which was won by Justin 
Trudeau’s Liberal Party. Select participants interviewed prior to the election were consulted 
again to inquire about the impact of the new federal government.  
Interview transcripts were analyzed drawing upon Kingdon’s Multiple Streams model 
(Kingdon, 2003) and the institutions-ideas-interest (“triple-I”) framework of agenda setting to 
identify potential factors that may prevent successful policy adoption (Bhatia & Coleman, 2003; 
Lavis, 2013; Lavis et al., 2002; Oberlander, 2003; Weller, 1980). Kingdon’s model highlights the 
key role of policy entrepreneurs in bringing together three streams (i.e., policy solutions, politics, 
and problems) in a window of opportunity to place an issue prominently on the policy agenda. 
The triple-I framework highlights the interaction of political institutions, ideas and ideologies, 
and interest groups in determining which issues receive greater attention among decision makers. 
Taken together, these two frameworks highlight the importance of favourable institutional rules, 
political climate, and timing in getting policies adopted.  Therefore, falling short on any of these 
factors represent challenges to establishing SISs. 
To complement interview data, public documents were obtained and analyzed. 
Specifically, relevant internal government documents were obtained through a Freedom of 
Information request to the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC). The 
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transcripts of provincial and federal legislative debates, municipal reports pertaining to SISs, and 
research reports were also reviewed. 
 
III. Results 
 
 Several factors explain why progress towards opening a SIS in Ontario has been slow. 
These barriers can be grouped into three categories: challenges related to the interjurisdictional 
policy context; resistance to SISs from the governing Conservatives; and factors related to 
provincial politics and timing. 
 
Interjurisdictionality 
 One of the challenges in establishing a supervised injection site in Canada related to the 
interjurisdictional nature of injection drug use.  Injection drug use engages both federal and 
provincial jurisdictions and cuts across health and criminal policy domains. The federal 
government is able to govern drug use through its constitutional jurisdiction over criminal laws 
while the province has constitutional authority to provide health services for injection drug users 
via its jurisdiction over health (Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 
2011). The interjurisdictionality of injection drug use creates challenges to policy adoption by 
virtue of engaging multiple levels of government who may have divergent interests.  
During the study period, the Conservative federal government took actions that made it 
particularly difficult to establish SISs in Ontario and elsewhere. In 2015, the Conservative 
government enacted the Respect for Communities Act (Bill C-2), which created 26 requirements 
that needed to be met in order to receive an exemption from the CDSA. These requirements 
included, but were not limited to, presenting scientific evidence of the medical benefit of SISs 
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and obtaining letters of opinion on SISs from the provincial minister of health, minister 
responsible for public safety, local police force, and community stakeholders (Government of 
Canada, 2015). Additionally, upon review of an application for exemption, Bill C-2 did not 
compel the federal health minister to grant an exemption from the CDSA (Butler & Phillips, 
2013). Rather, Bill C-2 used permissive rather than mandatory language, allowing the Minister to 
exercise his or her discretion in granting exemptions.  The passage of Bill C-2 was viewed by 
stakeholders as a clear signal of the Conservative government’s unwillingness to cooperate in the 
establishment of SISs:  
[The passage of Bill C-2] made it much more difficult for people to do the exemption 
application. I went to Health Canada and met with the [civil servants] who were in charge 
of the exemption application and they seemed really very – this is pre passing of the Bill 
– the people we met with were extremely helpful…. But then, subsequently, with the 
passage of the bill, that all fell by the wayside. – Ottawa stakeholder 
Bill C-2 added significant layers of work and obstacles before SISs could be approved 
(Eggertson, 2015). Ultimately, the federal government’s authority to grant exemptions highlights 
the need for support from the federal level in order to establish SISs in Ontario. 
 In addition to federal support, cooperation from the provincial government also 
contributes to the success (or failure) in establishing SISs. Given that health matters are under 
provincial purview, the operation of SISs would require provincial funding. However, opposition 
from the provincial government was not considered a critical obstacle that would end progress on 
SISs. According to internal MOHLTC documents, should the federal government grant an 
exemption, the province would not have the authority to prohibit the establishment of SISs 
(Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2012a). Nevertheless, the lack of recognition of the 
benefits of SISs and an unwillingness to provide funding for SISs effectively stalled what could 
have been more rapid progression in setting up an SIS in Ontario. As noted by two stakeholders: 
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[A]s health is a provincial responsibility, I think if our Minister [of Health and Long-
Term Care] could be very clear that this was something that is going to help Ontario get 
ahead of the HIV/Hepatitis C epidemic—and it would have to come with funding—I 
think that would be excellent. I think lack of funding … it’s been a barrier, let’s put it like 
that.  It’s been a barrier. – Ottawa Stakeholder  
I think funding is the big one as well. There’s not a lot of extra money for anything.  
These programs can’t run on nothing. …[T]hey would need staff to supervise the 
injection, and manage the service, and monitor and counsel and refer; so there’s a budget 
associated with the implementation of these programs.  I think that’s definitely going to 
be another barrier. – Toronto Stakeholder 
While there was consensus among stakeholders that the Ontario government did not necessarily 
“shut the door” on supervised injection sites, it also did not take actions to facilitate their 
establishment in Ontario. Thus, provincial cooperation (or lack thereof) added yet another 
element to address in the efforts to SIS establishment in Ontario. 
As a result of various layers of jurisdictional authority over this issue, and the need for 
cooperation from multiple stakeholders, establishing an SIS in Ontario required the coordination 
of several moving parts. According to another stakeholder: 
[O]ne of the policy challenges I think that we face here is that you’re trying to get federal, 
provincial, and local politics also aligned on the controversial political issue. So that’s 
one of the real challenges in getting something like this established. – Ottawa Stakeholder  
Support for SISs, even if implicit, was therefore required at local, provincial, and federal levels 
of governance, which was not in accord in Ontario during the study period. As illicit drug use 
intersected both criminal and health domains, establishing SISs required coordination of many 
actors in a complex policymaking environment. 
 
Conservative Party Resistance to SISs 
Another major reason for the lack of SISs in Ontario was the absence of applications for 
exemptions from agencies or clinics seeking to host a supervised injection facility. Part of the 
difficulty in submitting applications was related to Bill C-2. Through the creation of multiple 
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requirements, Bill C-2 in itself was a barrier for interested agencies to move forward with 
applications to establish SISs in Ontario. Agencies involved in delivering services for drug users 
noted that the number of requirements to submit an application for an exemption created a 
significant burden. Meeting the requirements required ample time and resources, which cash-
strapped community agencies often did not have to put together an application expediently. 
 A number of other factors were also responsible for discouraging community agencies 
from submitting exemption applications. One major deterrent was the federal Conservative 
government’s well-known opposition to SISs. During their tenure from 2006 to 2015, the 
Conservatives challenged the legality of Insite; called SISs a form of “harm addition” (Picard, 
2008); framed SISs as “heroin injecting sites” (Parliament of Canada, 2015; Postmedia News, 
2015); and removed harm reduction from the National Drug Strategy (Dooling & Rachlis, 2010). 
As discussed by several stakeholders, such opposition to harm reduction and SISs set a 
discouraging tone, indicating to community agencies in Ontario that the timing was not ideal to 
present a case for additional SISs:  
I think the current [Conservative] federal government has not been supportive of harm 
reduction. And that has created barriers itself. That flows through and so it makes it 
increasingly difficult to have the local level to implement anything if the federal 
government doesn’t have it under its umbrella. –Toronto Stakeholder  
It’s been frustratingly long to get here, but realistically we needed to change the federal 
[Conservative] government before anything was going to happen. …  [The Dr. Peter 
Centre in Vancouver] sent [their application] in and it’s been about 18 months that it’s 
been in there, and they haven’t heard back. And they met all the criteria of the new law 
[Bill C-2] as well because they’ve been operating for so long, they have all the things 
they asked for, and they still weren’t getting an answer. So the message was pretty clear: 
Don’t bother with this [Conservative] government. They were just not interested in 
supporting this at all. So there really was no point in submitting until now. –Ottawa 
Stakeholder  
I think they [the federal Conservatives] had a chilling effect because of all the opposition. 
You know, fighting it in the Supreme Court, developing an exemption process that was 
onerous. Bill C-2, which was very, very specific about the criteria you had to meet for an 
exemption, and they set the bar very high. – Toronto Stakeholder  
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Moreover, the Conservative government was often dismissive of research findings (Wood, Kerr, 
Tyndall, & Montaner, 2008), citing mixed research results and insufficient evidence to support 
continued operation of SISs (Galloway, 2008; Parliament of Canada, 2008). Harm reduction 
proponents, in contrast, interpreted the federal government’s reaction as a refusal to acknowledge 
empirical evidence of the public health benefits of SISs. As expressed by a Toronto stakeholder, 
“Our federal [Conservative] government doesn’t talk about science.  It doesn’t talk about facts 
and research, and in fact has been very open in silencing science and research.” Consequently, 
harm reduction advocates in Ontario largely felt discouraged from submitting an application 
exemption while the Conservative Party was in power.  
 A clear consensus emerged among key informants that a change in the federal 
government was needed in order for progress to be made in Ontario. In fact, with the election of 
the Liberal Party, stakeholders expect to see Ontario agencies begin to move forward more 
assertively with exemption applications. The Liberal Minister of Health recognized drug use as a 
significant issue and expressed openness to expanding SISs across Canada (Duggan, 2016). 
Stakeholders agreed that the change in federal leadership would improve the chances of 
establishing an SIS in Ontario, even if some local-level opposition remained. As an Ottawa 
stakeholder noted, “[I]f an oppositional letter from the police or mayor may have been a 
knockout punch before, it is no longer so.” Illustrating the extent to which Conservative 
opposition posed a barrier to SIS establishment, a second SISs in Vancouver was granted an 
exemption from the CDSA within three months of the Liberal government forming office 
(Health Canada, 2016). 
In addition to federal considerations, incongruent views from police leadership further 
discouraged applications from SIS proponents. Given the illegality of drug use, Toronto and 
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Ottawa police preferred abstinence through treatment and enforcement. Thus, creating a space 
for individuals to consume drugs was contrary to police goals of reducing illegal drug use. 
Moreover, police in Ontario favoured professional experience and anecdotal evidence to inform 
their opinion of SISs (Watson et al., 2012). As a result, police from Ontario’s two largest cities 
were not convinced SISs would consistently be used, undermining their effectiveness, and would 
potentially lead to new or worse problems in the community (Watson et al., 2012). 
The opposition among police placed a damper on applications particularly among 
agencies in Ottawa. Due to the unwavering opposition from Ottawa police, proponents were 
concerned that police could interfere with the operation of any new SISs located in Ottawa. As a 
result of the lack of support from the federal Conservatives and Ottawa police coupled with 
opposition from the Ottawa mayor and a lack of leadership from the provincial government, 
agencies in Ottawa were not encouraged to submit an exemption application.  
Among proponents for SISs in Ontario, there was agreement that the Conservative Party 
leadership did not value harm reduction services. The Conservative Party’s ideological 
preference for abstinence, and a persistent unwillingness to accept empirical evidence made for a 
hostile environment for the establishment of SISs in Ontario. 
 
Provincial Politics and the Importance of Timing 
 Even with the SCC decision and the TOSCA study results, and growing public support 
for SIS in Ontario (Strike et al., 2014), SISs remained low on the provincial agenda. The lack of 
funding and public endorsement was a key barrier and greater initiative on the part of the Ontario 
government was noted as an ingredient that would certainly facilitate forward progress on SISs.  
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 In response to the TOSCA report, the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care released 
the following statement: “Experts continue to be divided on the value of the sites. We have no 
plans to pursue supervised sites at this time” (Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2012b). 
Individuals close to the MOHLTC explained that the lack of initiative from the Minister was 
largely due to an unfavourable political climate at the time. At the time the TOSCA report was 
released, the provincial Liberal government was under fire for a number of controversial policy 
decisions that had evolved into public scandals. The governing Liberals had been criticized for a 
number of controversial decisions, including the eHealth spending scandal (Office of the Auditor 
General of Ontario, 2009); issuing promising lucrative renewable energy contracts to a 
consortium of Korean companies (without detailed economic analysis or the normal due 
diligence process) (Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2011); and moving gas power 
plants that were seemingly motivated by electoral considerations, resulting in the loss of over $1 
billion in public money (Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, the 
Liberals held a minority government that was at risk of losing confidence, and did not have 
sufficient political capital to take on a policy issue as highly contentious as supervised injection. 
These issues are highlighted in the following stakeholder quotations: 
So there was a risk, a perceived political risk of supporting something like this [SISs] for 
a government that was already feeling a little bit sensitive about its opportunity for 
reelection with some of the previous scandals that tend to accumulate for governments 
that have been in power for a period. There were several big things that meant that they 
didn’t have a lot of political capital to spend on something like supervised injection 
services. –Ottawa Stakeholder 
It’s [SISs] going to be a controversial public conversation.  And governments tend to 
limit the number of controversies that they’re involved in as much as they can. And they 
were looking at it thinking they had enough on their plate at that time without adding a 
new controversial issue to deal with. –Toronto Stakeholder  
The Government at the time was dealing with a lot of other pressures. You had a minority 
government. This was a hot button issue that the opposition could always use against you, 
because it’s very easy to blow it up in the media and in public opinion. … The 
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government at the time was dealing with a lot of other pressures and issues. There had 
been a couple of other major things blow up reflecting on their judgment and 
management. So a lot of things it’s a question of timing, right? If you really want to 
influence policy, you have to think about timing and what else is coming at them, and 
how important an issue this is going to be. –Toronto Stakeholder  
Thus, despite recommendations and support for SISs in Ontario, political pressures from 
competing policy interests had a considerable impact on the negative outcome of SISs in 
Ontario.  
 
IV. Discussion 
 
 Using Ontario as an example, this case study informs the possibilities and limits of 
adopting harm reduction policies related to injection drug use. This study extends the literature 
exploring the political determinants of health policy to supervised injection services and to harm 
reduction initiatives more generally. By focusing on why SISs have yet to be established in 
Ontario despite evidence of benefits and support among injection drug users and stakeholders, 
we identify key factors that may help or hinder the establishment of harm reduction services in 
the North American context.  
Political scientists have long noted the diffusion of public policy within and across 
countries, including in policy realms related to public health (Berry & Berry, 1990; Dolowitz & 
Marsh, 2000; Shipan & Volden, 2008; Studlar, 2002; Walker, 1969). Yet in North America, SISs 
have not taken root anywhere other than British Columbia. Given the challenges faced in 
transferring Vancouver’s innovation to Ontario, SISs represent a compelling case of policy non-
diffusion.   
The reasons for the lack of diffusion to Ontario can be attributed to the inherently 
complex nature of policymaking, particularly with respect to illegal drugs. The interjurisdictional 
nature of illicit drug use crossing both health and criminal elements necessitates multiple levels 
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of government involvement in order for the successful adoption of SISs in any province. 
Moreover, opposition from the federal government (a critical actor in granting approval for SISs) 
and police placed a damper on the willingness of agencies to submit proposals for SISs in 
Ontario. Lastly, the political environment at the provincial level was not conducive to 
shouldering another contentious issue.  
Inopportune timing posed a significant challenge in getting SISs established in Ontario. 
In the case of Ontario, provincial authorities did not pursue SISs because of the immediate 
pressure to deal with competing political priorities (in arenas outside of public health, no less). 
This illustrates how such policies, particularly contentious harm reduction issues, are not 
considered in isolation. The success or failure of other seemingly unrelated policies had an 
impact on the prospects of SISs in Ontario. Thus, given that policymaking happens in a web of 
decision-making, rather than isolated silos, sound empirical evidence calling for SISs may not be 
sufficient to move such sensitive issues to the top of the policy agenda. This represents an 
important lesson for public health advocates: the presence of sound empirical evidence may not 
be enough; timing and a suitable political environment is critical to pushing a controversial and 
stigmatized public health program higher on the policy agenda (Kingdon, 2003). 
Although illicit drug use continues to be a stigmatized behaviour among the public 
(MacCoun, 2012), key informants did not consider this to be the major barrier to adoption. 
Rather, key informants noted that public opinion on harm reduction services and drug use 
gradually shifted towards a willingness to accept SISs if its goal was to provide health related 
services (Strike et al., 2014). Nevertheless, Conservative opposition to SISs was rooted in a 
moral opposition to illicit drug use, which was characterized as unacceptable and criminal 
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behaviours. These sentiments motivated several policy actions that made the adoption of SISs in 
Ontario far more challenging. 
 One of the limitations of a single case study focused on Ontario is the potential for 
limited generalizability to other contexts. Advocates in many other North American cities have 
called for supervised injection facilities. However, the particular policy context (including pre-
existing programs available for injection drug users) and the nature of the drug use problem may 
not be the same in other jurisdictions considering supervised injection services. Furthermore, 
while the key informants represented stakeholders involved in various aspects of the 
policymaking process, they were geographically concentrated in southern Ontario, particularly in 
Ottawa and Toronto. The experience in smaller Ontario markets, though exposed to the same 
provincial and federal rules, may differ according to variations in local politics. 
Nevertheless, the experience in Ontario provides considerable information on the 
conditions that would facilitate SIS establishment in a North American context. The Ontario case 
represents a federal system with multiple layers of governance, which is applicable to other 
Canadian cities considering SISs as these cities operate in the same federal-provincial policy 
context. The Ontario case is also informative for advocates and health policy officials in the 
U.S., as state-sanctioned injection drug sites would require cooperation among federal 
lawmakers in order to operate (Beletsky et al., 2008). Moreover, the impact of political timing 
transcends national boundaries, and is a valuable lesson for proponents in Canada and the U.S. 
The Ontario case thus highlights the barriers to overcome in order for a stigmatized health issue 
to reach the top of the policy agenda. 
As opioid overdoses climb in major metropolitans across North America (Rudd, Aleshire, 
Zibbell, & Gladden, 2016), policy interventions to address the problem are in high demand. 
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Harm reduction programs such as supervised injection services are one potential policy tool to 
address this problem. In order to successfully implement such programs dealing with a highly 
stigmatized issue, policy actors need to be equipped not only with sound empirical evidence of 
need, feasibility, and cost effectiveness; but also with a solid understanding of the broader 
political environment in which policymaking occurs. In the political arena, where policy 
priorities constantly compete with each other, timing is everything.  
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Table 4.1 Number and type of key informant interviewees 
Type of Key Informant N 
Policymaker  2 
Agency/Program Delivery 5 
Researchers/Academic 2 
Grassroots Advocates 2 
Total 11 
 
 
